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Foreword
Trygve Lie, in assessing the performance of the Powers at the United Nations,
wrote some years ago: "Russian reasoning is always more difficult to understand.
Even after seven years as Secretary-General, I cannot pretend to speak with
assurance as to how the Soviet mind is made up." 1 ' Mr. Lie's uncertainty is
indicative of the unique problems that confront the analyst of Soviet international
behavior generally and at the United Nations in particularo
Friends and foes agree on the constancy and continuity of Soviet long-range
objectives, The motivation of the Soviet leadership-and its representatives abroad,
however, has over the course of years remained a matter of intense speculation and
dispute. How relavant are ultimate goals to current Soviet conduct? How "sincere"
is Soviet participation in international organizations? To what extent can Soviet
moves and pronouncements be taken at face value? There are no simple or certain
answerso One basic difficulty is of course the outsider's inability ever to know
to what extent words express genuine attitudes or to what extent overt behavior
corresponds to intent-
If performance is taken as an index to motives, Soviet action at the United
Nations only adds to the puzzlement, As in other sectors of Soviet conduct, Moscow
has over the years reversed its policies to the extent that its analysis of political
constellations and opportunities changed, In 1945=1946 Moscow favored a strong
Secretary-General for the United Nations; in 1952 it charged the Secretary-General
with exceeding his authority. Until recently the Soviet delegation made itself
the watchdog of the prerogatives of the Security Council, opposing all attempts
to strengthen the kGeneral Assembly-only to wind up submitting issues to the lattere
Are these changes of style or of substance?
lo Trygve Lie, I s_ (lew York: Macmillan, 1954), p, 18p
2In attempting an analysis of Soviet views the observer is greatly handi-
capped by an e-forced reliance solely on the standard, official sources. We
have no direct knowledge of the decision-making process, let alone the "inside"
reasoni1g, of the Kremlin. We have no reliable measure of Soviet "public opinion"
-- which tends o be either a "private" opinion,> carefully kept out of public ear-
shot, or e.se a stilted echo of the' official "line. " Thus the Soviet view of the
United Nations can be inferred only from a combination of general assumptions
au oiet tn " C Soviet pronoun s and moves at the United Nation-
and comments about it by Soviet personnel ar in Soviet publications,
The following is an attempt to uncover the Soviet view of the United Nations
by a process perhaps comparable to triangulation-=or rather, moving in on the
object from several relativeily specific areas of analysis: (1) the broad ideo--
logical as suimptions and comitments of the Soviet leadership with regard to inter-
natiohal relations and organizations'; (2) the historical perspective,, on the
assumptions that (everything else being equal) a continuity of policy and outlook
is morei likely than not to eventuate, and (3) some functional analysis of the
practice of the Soviet Union and its objectives at the United Nations. Indeed,
the Soviet view of the United Iations-as,, no doubt, that of other states-is
overwhelmingly a derivative of broader policy.
The record of the United Nations is r apidly growing voluminous to the point
where it becomes an unwieldy and forbidding mountain of primary information-, All
the more surprising,, then, is the near-absence of systematic published studies of
Soviet performance at the United Nations except for some highly competent but
rather specialized articles and monographs . All the more reason,, too, for document
in- the preaent essay more thoroughly than is perhaps otherwise called for in a
survey of thi.s sort -wherever possible referring to English-language sourcesz
3INTERNATIONAL LW AND ;0ERNATIOL ORPAI ZATION:
THE SOVIET VIEW
ThQ Soviet outlook on world affairs amounts to an extension of the Communist
view of domestic politics. It is deeply rooted in a perception of the historical
process as progress through struggle. Both elements, progress and struggle, are
inalterable parts of the dialectic process0 expressed during the present historical
epoch primarily in the conflict between capitalism and proletariat (and, by exten-
sion, other downtrodden classes and peoples). The international arena in the age
of imperialism.-itself viewed as the highest stage of capitalism-is typified by
conflicts among competing imperialist powers, such as the first 'World '3ar, and by
conflicts between the exploiters and the exploited, such as the struggle between
the colonial powers and the "suppressed" colonies, or (since 19?) between the
Soviet and the capitalist states. fIile the first type of conflict leads to
*unjust" wars, the latter type represents, as it were, a horizontal geographical
projection of the class struggle from the national onto the international stage.
The "classic" Communist outlook-amply reiterated of late by Nikita Khrushchev-
includes in its essentials belief in "Marxism-Leninism" as the only truly "sci-
entific" analysis of social and political processes; a vision of ultimate goals,
and an abiding faith in their inevitable attainment 0 The inevitable triumAph of
the "exploited," whom the Soviet state purports to represent and champion, logi.
cally and explicitly entails the downfall of their "exploiters" and enemies--in
substance, the non-Communist world as a political and socio-economic system0 And,
while individual tants- of theBolshevik faith may be amender or even -discarded (as
Khrushchev has shown himself capable of doing) and others may be elaborated (in the
name of "creative" Marxism) 0, the commitment too and acceptance of. such simple
formulae as the inevitable victory of communism over capitalism and the identi-
fication of the Soviet state with Good and the non-Soviet world with Evil have
been so thoroughly engrained over years and generations that they are scarcely
susceptible to change or eradication.
4It is precisely the permanence of long-range objectives that permits-and
commands-maximum flexibility of means in the struggle for their attainment., Both
Lenin and Khrushchev are explicit on this point. The zigzags in Soviet tactics,
the enigmatic switches of "line," the seeming caprice and stubbornness, the peculiar-
ities in negot.iatory techniques are all to a large extent explicable in these terms;
they are a logical part of the system, not aberrations or deviations from it. At
the same time, it is important to remember that Soviet policyf-makers are neither
omniscient nor faultinsa, that they are not all of one mind at all times, and that
Soviet policy itself does not remain static. To stress the continuity of the out-
look and its ideological underpinnings is not to suggest the absence of variations
in intensity, in realism, in method, and in competence. Changing Soviet participation
in international organizations is itself an example of 3uch alterations over the
course of time.
Another trend has been the shift from the early days of "proletarian culture"
to the present era of striped pants; from open defiance of conventional diplomacy
to secret treaties; from studied unconventionality to E nily Post. The Soviet con .
cern for appearance-the analog to "bourgeois" values i foreign conduct--has grcwn
remarkably as the Soviet Union has striven to become a full-fledged member of the,.
family of nations,
The concern for form and convention has not , however , led to any appreciable
doubt about the inevitability of the global transform:ation in which the Soviet Urjion
must play a central role, Nor has it produced any serious questioning or tne
percoption of tension and strugglenot as exceptions out as norms of civil
and international conduct, Whether or not the international atmosphere be-
comes more clement at a given moment, the basic structure of relations betueer
the Soviet Union and the non-communist world, as perceived in Moscow, is an
antagonistic one--expressed in the of t-repeated formula of kto-kovo: "who-
whom?"
1, See Nathan Leites, A Stu of Bolshevism (Glencoe, Ill,: Free Press, 1953).
p. 29 ff.
5In the Communist view, history moves in stages, and each stage is achieved in
successive rounds. The basic difficulty of the present epoch arises from the happen-
stance that both political types, the old and the new-the capitalist and the commun-
ist--exist side by side; hence. the problems of "coexistence" until the inevitable
victory of the new, Soviet policy must be calculated to assist and speed this victory
One problem with the Soviet analysis. of the present world scene--and the
United Nations in particular.-goes back to a dilemma which the Kremlin may be
scarcely aware of: the tension between the impulses toward universality and exclu-
siveness ih the Communist appeal0  Ever since its beginnings Bolshevism has tried
to cope with the dilemma posed by the impulse, on the one hand, to "go it alone,"
to limit the movement to a small &ite of pure, devoted, professional revolution-
aries, and, on the other hand, to seek a mass following, a broad social base and
support even outside the proletariat. A sense of uniqueness, superiority, and
mission have thus clashed with an urge to identify with the majority of mankind.
The result is a split in attitudes and behavior, which contains elements of infer-
iority and superiority, and a conflict between the search for world-wide legitimacy
and a sense of self-sufficiency
This condition has contributed to the "dual code" of Soviet conduct. In crudest
terms, it has meant keeping others out of Soviet territory but trying to intrude
or infiltrate and gather information abroad. There is yet another dilemmas the
Soviet Union has striven to become a legitimate nation-state; yet it has continued
to employ the international Communist apparatus to work in its behalf abroad, The
Soviet difficulty at the United Nations has thus been part of the general difficulty
of a "revolutionary" regime which does not feel bound by capitalist rules operating
in a fundamentally alien or hostile environment. 2 It is the problem of a state with
2. See William R. Kintner, "The Soviet Union's Use of the UN," MS (Foreign Policy
Research Institute, Philadelphia, Pa., 1958), p. 1; J. Frankel, "The Soviet Union
and the United Nations," Y2arbook g Wrld Affaira 1954, p. 69; Irene Blumenthal
"The Soviet Union and the United Nations," I-S, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (incomplete, ned.), pp. 5-9.
The Soviet Union is "revolutionary," ot course, in a sui generis sense:
while it strives to upset the international balance in its favor, it is, as has
been suaaested,. suoremelv coiservative in many resoects both within the Soviet
orbit and at the United Nations.
6"two.-camp" dialectic trying to operate in a "one-world" organization.
Moscow does not view the United Nations and the International Court of Justice
as above classes and politics. The state and its institutions are, in conventional
klarxist terms, instruments of compulsion wielded by the rulihg class. If this is
true of law, which is itself a product of the bourgeois era and i, hound to iJ'a ser
once a communist society is built, what international law caj there be for "social.
ist" n "capitalist" societies? The problems here suggested have been the sub-
ject of vigorous, tortuous, and at times fatal debate since the Bolsheviks came
to powera
From the original "purist" outlook that the bourgeois forms of stpe la% and
morals cannot be filled with socialist content (as Pashukanis argued), the Soviet
Union moved in the 1920's to the view that laws must-remain. "but our laws are At
11 m:n-ents determine d by revolutionary necessity,"4 There soon came the reaffir-
mation that law expresses the will of the ruling class and strives to establith or
safeguard an order advantageous for it it. Vyshinsky was to reiterate this vittw
d nauseam. But here was the rub: if both the Soviet state and a foreign count
the two having different social systems and ruling classes, had distinct laws as
parts of their superstiucture, how could they share a common set of international
law and rules or order? On the level of theory the problem proved refractory0  If
Itternational law was socialist, it could not have antedated 1917 and could not
bind capitalist states; if it was capitalist, it could not bind the Soviet Union;
to say that it was classless was patently anti-Marxist. Finally, after some debate
in 1954 the view prevailed that international law was the totality of elemnents
common to both capitalist and socialist superstructures just as criminal law under
socialism and capitalism shared certain features.I In similar fashion, 1ne may
3. Lazar Kaganovich, report to the Institute of Science and Law of the Cc nunit
Acaemy, 1929; cited in Ivo Larenra, 2 pto.rs o i oues e d
n l ( : 5 ' 36,
'0 Ar 1'
7suggest, Moscow would describe the rules of international organizations as the
common denominator of two systems,
Characteristically, the discussion ended with an editorial admonition to
explore the practice (rather than the theory) of international law--and here the
ground was simpler to cover, After the Communist Party's Central Committee decided
in 1946 that international law could be used to Soviet advantage, the 1948 text-
book by Kozhevnikov (now Soviet judge on the International Court) made plain that
the Soviet Union recognizes those parts of international law "which can facilitate
the execution of the stated tasks of the USSR" and rejects those "which conflict
in any manner with these purposes," Since in the Communist view international
law is not a set of changeless rules either of divine origin or the essence of
reason, the Soviet state can be selective and manipulative in its use of it,
frankly accepting it as an instriment of state policy,5 In the words of a leading
Soviet international lawyer, "the Soviet governmentls practice in international law
is shaped under the influence of the objectives and principles of its foreign policy,
which flow from the very nature of the Soviet state," 5a
Yet the problem has remained whether international law is the same the world
over or whether there is not a socialist international law to guide the relations
among the states of the Soviet orbit (and Communist China), In 1938 Vyshinsky
(arguing against Korovin) condemned the latter view, But with the emergence of
the "people's democracies" and the substitution (An Soviet parlance) of the %orld
system of socialist states" for the previously lone Soviet Union, and with the
growing gulf between East and West (accepting, for the sake of convenience, these
basically misleading labels), Moscow reaffined in 1949 that "it is already possible
5, See John No Hazard, _E , Change jthe USSR (London: Stevens l Sons, 1953),
pp. 275, 295.
5a, D. B, Levin, onowy problemy sovremennogo mezhdunarodnogo prava (Moscow:
GoCiurizdat, 1958)r, p, 12.
to Speak of the birth of elements of socialist international law." The view now
was tha under zccialim, even if the forma remain the same, international law
obtia n w r and qualitatively superior conten.
6& of lpbi p. 300; F, Kozhevnikov, Sovetekoe gosudarstvo i. mezhduiarodnoe prayv
(Noscow, 1949), po 24; V0 GFQeneralorr~b~snownykh chertakb mehdunarodno=
pravovo sotrudnichestva Sov Soiuza i stran narodnoi demokratii ," Sovetskoe
gosudanstvo, i pravo, 1950, no, 7, pr, 1=26.Ibid, 1952, no. 7 ~
8Momentarily, during the post-Stalin "thaw" of 1955-1956, soviet jurists verpr
pared to acknowledge that the theory of distinct socialist international law was n on-
sense. But the general tightening of the post-Hungary era also witnessed an explicit
reassertion of unique and superior socialist law, It bus been correctly suggested that
the Soviet Union would rather have two different sets of law and models of international
behavior--one pertaining to the Soviet orbit, and the other to the outside world, 7
Now Korovin is prepared to argue that bourgeois concepts, sach as equality, independence,
and sovereignty, are fully achieved only under socialist conditions--and socialist inter-
national law. -In additon, socialist relations "make it necessary to create new legal
forms that are adequately suited to the new content"; "proletarian internationalism" is
the main formula to describe them., Or, to put it more bluntly, "in the same way that
the victory of socialism throughout the world is inevitable, so too is in the complete
triumph of corresponding relations between peoples, At the base of these lie tte great
and tested principles of Maknism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism." Capitalism
"has outlived its epoch, and the same is equally true of the corresponding type of
9
international relations." Finally, early in 1959 the head of the Legal and Treaty
Division of the Soviet foreign office reaffirmed the new view: relations ariong socialist
states were subject to unique and qualitatively superior rules In fact, "one cannot
reduce the international-legal principles of relations among the countries of the
7. Jan Triska, "What Price Cooperation?" Doctoral Dissertation, Haravard University,
1956, p1 163ff; a stimulating piece of research and reflection.
8, E. Korovin, "Proletatrian Internationalism in World Relations," International Affairs
(Moscow), 1958, no, 2, pp, 25-27, International Affairs is the English language
edit.on of the authoritative Soviet warld affairs monthly, Mezhdunarodnaiazhizn
9. S Sanakoyev, "The Basis of the Relations Between the Socialsit Countries," Inter-
national Affairs, 1958, noc 7, pp. 23-24. See also E. G. Panfilov, " arksiz-Leniniam
o deiaokraticheskom i spravedlivom mire,," Vopros1 filosofii, 1958, no 4 pp.71'-27
L. Vasilev, "K voprosu o vneshnikh funktsiiakh sotsialisticheskogo gesudarstva,
Sovetskoe gosudarstzo i pravo, 1958, no, 6; and Levin, op, cit., pp. 28-39,
9socialist camp to principles of common nternational law." To do so would be to
"roll down anto the traexs o nn Vhe quagmire if bour-
geois normativism
A strict purist "and thoroughly impracticai) reading of the lortrine might
lead one to think that the Soviet leaders would see no Justification for partici-
pating in the United 4ations or other organizations cutting across "world systems"
and not controlled by them Yet in Pact the Soviet Union has remained a member
(though for some years with serious misgivings)-largely out of a practical calculus
which suggests that membership is preferable to absence in terms of risks and rewards,
Actual policy decisions, then, are made on levels remote from abstruse theorizing.
On one level of analysis we eneounter continued evidence of Soviet exclu-
ivenessa-in theory and in visceral response,.. Once an international organiza-
tion becomes a political force impinging on the latitude of choice and plenitude
of aovereignty of member states, the Soviet Union hastens to oppose such auth-
ority., It has consistently fought all schemes of world states and world fed-
erations (under other than Communist auspices), It has insisted that the United
Nations represents governmenta, not peoples, It can ot share the UNESCO outlook,
based on "idea.istic, bourgeois conceptions concerning the causes of wars, con-
cerning the non-partisan character" of science and culture," or its hope that a
philosophical synthesis of East and West can be produced, 1 1  It has arrogated
to itself the role of speaking for "all progressive classes" and for "all toilers
of the world," t has assumed that the Soviet Union and the socialist camp cannot
be wrong, As one writer has put it, the subjective criteria in Soviet international
law and outlook amount to "class justice" pro-
10, G, L Tunkin, "Novyi tip mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii i mezhdunarodnoe pravo,"
Sovetskoe osudarstvo i1 pravo, 1959, no,. 1, pp. 92-94,
11, Viadislav Ribniker replying to Julian Huxlevy, at first UNESCO General Confer-
ence; and Uchitaelskaia gazeta (Moscow), January 20, 1951; cited in John A,
Arms trong, * The Soviet Attitude toward UNESCO," International Organization,
1954, no , pp., 218-219, 232.,
10
jected abroad,12 On this level, a Soviet observer wiuld concur with the view that
if states are so fundamentally divided that international society is essentially
an arena of national struggle rather than a cormmunity, there is no real
possibiLity that an internation.-l government or international organization
can be anytilng other than an instrument whi*ch com'etitive states and blocs
seek to capture for use -, waging the bitter strug1le'. 3
On another level this outlook does not prevent the Soviet Union from participatingri
inrteFnational activiti-s alon with non-Com-unist states, Th4 course o-^ '3viet
conduct over forty years has been, after all, dotted with co'prorio. If% as some
aver, Russia has witnessed a "great retreat,," it has keen a retreet from oure
theory to a msterT of politics as the art of the possible., It has been the aban-
donment of wha-t Lenin called the "infantile disease" of Leftism for the sake of
,reater e'fectiveness, greater success, and grenter revurds, From the Trenty
ofr rest-Litovsk to the acceptance of monetary incentives for production, from
the establishmient of collective (rather than state-owneo) farms to the pergtt-
uation of the army, law, and conventional diplomacy,, Soviet poliev has seen a
"temporary" acquiescence in an imperfect present and the indefinit- postp-nement
of a better future, The attitude toward internation.l orgaiization has undergone
correspondin- chan-e
Consciously divorcing the "revolutionary" Party from tie state,, *oscow has
been prepare'i to assume obligations in the community, of nations and to institution-
alize the duality of its conduct by signing treaties and joining the League and the
United lrtions while promoting the Communist International or sinilar organizatione,
The problem has be-n amoral; it has been entIrely a prac-ti'al one,, As Oliver J.
Lissitzyn has shown, "the basic Soviet cconception of international law is intenselv
practical, International law is accepted to the extent that it serves the interests
l? 9l'menthal, o,, cit, p . 10-14z. Soviet authorities cnntinue to nold that
international law hns a "class, superstructural charceter" (e . A
nauk, Institut orvn .tzhdunarodnoe grno (Xoscow: Gosiurizdat l277), pP 3, 6)
13, inis Lo Clau le, Jr, " wor- s into _lowsrires Jew York. rando, Vus, 17 39
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of thi Soviet state."1 Tence also "practical" Soviet acceptance of mrnbership in
the United 1ations--without unwarranted blindness or enthusiasm, The "two-camp"
or tlook does not prelude coexistence, To the extent that both "camls" accept it j.
international law (in its widest sense) is thus a measure of the existing balance
of power in the "transitional" phase,15
There is no doubt that Soviet policy has been shaped bverwhelmaingly in terms of
power relations outsd The United Nations,, which has not conventionally been con-
ceived of as a major force.- iMoscow has never been particularly hopeful about inter-
national organiza'tions not controlled by the Soviet bloc. It is precisely because
of the special truce--like and transitlonal character of covenants between the
"socialist carp" arid the outside world that Moscow has insisted (as Fanerson and
Claude correctly put it some years ago) that the United Nations amounted to a
treaty relationship, to be "held within a strict construCtion of its contractual
termsb"
There will be occasion to review the consequences of this outlook, from whicht,
as will be seen, stem Soviet "conservatisn" and comAitment to strict and literal
interpretation ofC the charter. Lence also Sovet insistence on national sovereignty
and veto power, since in oscowr view any extension of UN authority is bound to
weaken the weo.-Jer party. In the bipolar view, the Soviet bloe a (at least until
the recant past) been the perpetual ainority-aand some of o 4 behavior at the
United Nations has steimmed from its awareness of this inferior status. Hence also
Soviet hostility to compulsory arbitration and to acceptance of the decisions of
14, Oliver J, iissityn "Recent Soviet Literature on International Law, a .in
Slavic _a Emio RyewM Decemiber1 1952, pp 262 63- See also Frankel
15 see, eg, Korovines article,, in Lo1shat sovetsai entsilr > ( oscow, 195L,
2d ed ),r XX7I2E, 23.
16, See C. Dale Fuller, "Soviet Policy in the United Nations, i w*
May1 I p na141a
16a, Rupert F-merson and Inis L,,, Cl'auda,- "The Sovie!t 'Union -nvi the U"nit-d Ntos
criaton'l (Drfnni".sFtirAm 95
12
of the International Court; as suggested above, the "socialist camp" cannot be
found wrong, and certainly not by a capitalist or even mixed jutyo7 ilence also
Soviet insistence on unanimity and preference for non-political bodies. lence
Soviet rejection of reformism as a basic philosoply of peaceful, gradual change.
And hence also the Soviet difficulty in participating in an organizntion where
the art of compromise is of the essence for effective operation. Unfamilisr with
the tradition of loyal minority participation, the Bolsheviks have found a basic
block in their own make-up when confronted with an organization which requires
tolerance and restraint amidst widely divergent views, and which by its nature
cannot operate on the basis of either Soviet domination or Soviet absence.
17, Cf. Fullter, p ct- , pp, 14344; and Lpiityr co 2
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TilE SOVIET UNION A.lD IiUTERNATICNAL ORANIZATIOt: T12 ANTSMiCECDT
Lenin and International Orjanisationj
The Russian Bolsheviks, like Xarxists elsewhere, envisagred the eventual emer-
gence of a voluntary international commonwealth. Until the state and with it all
organs of compulsion "withered" there was needed an International--a league of
Communist parties and perhaps Communist nations, but surely not of capitalist states*
Lenin had toyed briefly with the slogan of a United States of Europe, but he
came to recognize that its realization under capitedLism was impossible, in 'arxist
terms, except as a "reactionary" bloc against a socialist state (or perhaps the
United States), Given his conviction that war eas inevitpble as long as capitAlism
existed, Lenin was bound to reject international organizations as effective instru-
ments to safeguard world peace, Peade, moreover, wPs not the supreme objective of
the Bolsheviks, adept though theftv ase of the peace slogan has been. Surely no
revolutionary state would abandon its elan and mission or subordinate its decision
making to a super-national body controlled by 'enemy" states. 1
When the League of Nations came to life, the Soviet leadership was bound to
view it with scorn and hostility, On..the one hand, it could secure only a "mirage"
of peace; in Lenin's terms, real and lasting peace could be assured only under
socialism (just a, in later years, it was claimed that "real" sovereignty could be
secured only under Soviet conditions). On the other hand, the League was create by, rd
inevitably made .an instrument of, "imperialist" powers, The Bolshevik theory of
capitalism the reality of Allied intervention, the a 2riori assumption of a "cap_
italist encirckement," and the belief in the ability of socialist states alone to
solve Int-rnatipnal problems all combined to make Moscow denounce the League--into
which, moreover, the Soviet state had not been invited.
1. Cf. C, Vale Fuller, "Lenin's Attitude towArd an International Or anizaton:
the Maintenance of Peace, 1914-1919" (Russian Institute Certifinte r y -
Columbia University, 19,48).
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It was natural therefore for Lenin to describe the League either as a coalition
of the hostile Versailles powers 2 or as an ineffective instrumentality rent asunder
by "contradictions" within the capitalist fold. 3 If the League was the symbol of
the zapitalist victors, the Third International became the rallying poinL; of the
down-trodden in the bipolar dialectic of the Bolshevik world view,
The Leaue of Nations. 1919-1934: The Leaue as an Anti-Soviet Bloc
The view of the League as an enemy headquarters remained substantially un-
shaken for the following decade. Occasionally a political crisis would elicit
confirmation that 4oscow had not changed its mind. In the wake of Locarno the
Soviet leadership feared that Germany--Russia's major friend and potential ally
among the "have-not 0 Powers of Europe-might be lured into membership of the League
of Nations and claimed to fear that it would serve, with Poland, as an approach
route for enemy forces against 3oviet Russia. Soviet policy in cementing a
Russia-centered series of alliances with Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Germany
amounted indeed to what one analyst has called an "Anti-League," 4 predicated on
the assumption that the League itself was bound to constitute an offensive bloc dir-
ected against the Soviet Uiion. Foreign Commissar Chicherin was reported as plan-
ning to set up a "League of Peos' to juxtapose to the capitalists assembled at
Genevao 5
2o "The so-called League of Nations is nothing but an insurance policy in which
the victors mutually guarantee each other their prey0 " (Lenin, "Theses on the
National and Colonial Questions0 August 1920, presented to the Second Congress
of the Communist International0 )
3 h "It has been proven that the League of Nations actually does not exist, that
the Union of capitalist powers is simply a deception, and that it represents
two vultures trying to tear the prey from each other." (Lenin in October 1920
on the Franco-British disagreements heightened by the Soviet-Polish war.) Nee
Xenia Eudin and Harold H. Fisher, eds., Soviet Russia . the teata 1920-192?
(Stanford University Press0 1957), PPo 121-22, 152.
4. Paul iiliukov, La politique extiri up t S (Paris, 1934), goes so far
as to entitle the chapter on the mid-6twenties "L'Anti-Ligue."
5. Alexander Barmine, One W Survived (New York: Putnam's, 1945), p. 117.
15
During the crisis of December 1925 Chicherin in an interview with the German
Communist paper Rote Fahn explained with candor that the incompatability of the
Soviet Union and the League was due to the fact that they "are built on different
principles7'and therefore no community of assumptions and methods was possible
between them, "Never, under any circumstances," he was quoted as saying. "will
Russia join the League of Nations (which isj...an instrument of capitalist mach.
inations against the weak countries and the colonial peoples." 6
A somewhat more practical consideration was advanced, among others, by
Christian Rakovsky (in an article in Foreign Affairs in July 1926): since Soviet
Russia needed peace and security to "build socialism," in the existing circum-
stances its foreign policy had to avoid all entangling alliances and commitments
such as League membership required.
And yet the Soviet Union was beginning to adjust to "peaceful coexistence"
with a system of capitalist states which were experiencing a "temporary stabilization."
Moscow established diplomatic relations and concluded treaties. Its policy toward
the League and other international organs varied with the requirements of general
strategy. It was proud to be invited to the Genoa Conference in 1922--where the
Soviets went, in Lenin's words, not as Communists but as businessmen. Moscow
began to cooperate with non-political and technical agencies, such as the League's
Epidemic Commission. 7 Moscow offered to attend an international conference on
naval disarmament. In a characteristic note, it informed the Secretary-General
6, Cited in M1iliukov, one 9it9, po 304o Alexei Rykov declared on December 5, 1925:
"The League of Nations is a little business undertaking that deals in peoples; it
passes them over, as it sees fit, in the form of mandates, to the so-called states
of high culture, which defend their mandate rights by force of arms and mercilessly
enslave the peoples under their tutelage. For this reason the East would naturally
regard us as traitors if we were to stand behind the counter of this shop. We shall
not do so...." (Cited in Eudin and Fisher, op. cit., p. 321.) Commenting on the new
Soviet treaty with Turkey, Izystia editorialized on December 24, 1925: "The peoples
of the USSR and of the East will.coregulate their relations ...without recourse to
the Leaguc of Nations, outside the League and in spite of the League, which legalizes
robbery and violence by the strong against the weak states."
7, Cf. Kathryn W. Davis, Ia Sovis at Geneva (Geneva: Kundig, 1934), p. 7
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of the League of Nations on Miarch 15, 1923:
The Soviet government still believes that this quasi-international
institution actually serves as a screen to conceal from the masses the
predaTtory imperialist purposes of some great powers and their vassals.
0..Without in the least deviating in principle from its attitude
toward the league of Nations, the Soviet government is nevertheless
prepared to consider the proposed conference as an assembly of repre-
sentatives of individual states....The Soviet government believes that
without the participation of Russia and her allies this conference will
prove fruitless.0
Principled hostility-and qualitative transformation of the enemy body into a
useful one when the Soviet Union adhered--were to remain part of the Soviet response.
From about 1927 on, 4oscow's hostility toward the League wreakened further.
Stalin and the advocates of "socialism in one country" had now triumphed in VMoscow.
Weimar Germany was a member of the League and would presumably help prevent an
anti-Soviet move. And while the Communist International-formally divorced from
the Soviet state--continued to fulminate against Geneva,9 the Soviet foreign office
smoothed the path for Russian participation in the World Economic Conference and
the Preparatory Commission for the disarmament conference in 1927-28. The strategy
toward the League was thus evolving in unison with broader Soviet foreign policy
decisions- The period from 1928 to 1933 was characterized by the giant exertions of
forced collectivization of agriculture and the first Five-Year Plan in Soviet Russia.
Abroad, Moscow pursued a dual course of "ultra-leftism" in the Comintern and mod-
erate alliances on the diplomatic level. Increasing Soviet participation in
international organizations went hand in hand with endorsement of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact and the sponsorship of the Mioscow Protocol of 1929.
8. Iu. V. Kliuchnikov and A. Sabanin, L nezhdUnernaai politika... (Moscow: NKID, 1929),III, 238. Other aspects of Soviet disarmament policy are discussed below. on pp.
9o The Sixth Congress of the Communist International resolved in Moscow in 1928:
"The League of Nations...is itself more and more becoming a direct instrument
for preparing and carrying out the war against the Soviet Union. The alliances
and pacts concluded under the protectidn of the League of Nations are direct
means for camouflaging preparations for war and are themselves instruments for
the preparation of war, and especially war against the Soviet Union." (Cited in
"The Struggle against Imperialist War and the tasks of the Communists," in William
Henry Chamberlin, ed.,, Blueorint fp= 7ord ConquesD (Washington: Hu~an Events, 1946)0
17
Moscow left no doubt that such cooperation meant no romantic acceptance of
the League system or reconciliation with its sponsors0  It was symptomatic that
the Soviet Union rather consistently rejected arbitration of international dis-
putes. As Maim Litvinov had declared in 1922, it would be impossible to find
impartial judges iti view of the abyss of hatred between communism and capitalism.
The "two-world" view still prevailed.
The LeaZue of Nations, 1934-1939: The Soviet Union as a Iember
Until 1933 the Soviet leadership had apparently hoped that the economic depres-
sion, coupled with an intransigent radicalism of Communists abroad, would usher in
a new, second round of revolutionary upheavals. Instead, it found itself confron-
ted with the double menace of an expansionist Japan and a Nazi Germany--each with
designs on Soviet territory. After first trying to ignore, appease, or rationalize
the intentions of his two new rivals. Stalin by the end of 1933 reversed strategies,
and began to hunt for allies abroad, Before long the Soviet Union signed treaties
of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia; and in 1935 the Seventh (and
last) Comintern Congress replaced the "ultraleftist" course of 1928 with an endorse-
ment of the "popular front." No longer were all non-Communists equally bad; no
longer was it a matter of letting the enemies fight it out among themselves. Now
the strategy was to ally with the lesser foes against the greater--the German-
Japanese menace. Soviet entry into the League was a logical part of this strategic
reversal. The shift was hemiL6ed by Stalin when he declared on December 25, 1933"
iv% rmnv to a gumstion by, Walter Dranty of Tha ?y York Times whether his attitude
t tho L. ''apue was "always wholly negative":
PC, riot always and not in all circumstances. Perhaps you do not quite
understand0 ... The League may act in some degree like a brake. retarding or
preventing the outbreak of hostilities, If that were so,, if 6he League
were to turn out an obstacle, even a small one, that made war more difficult,
while it furthered, even ty0a small extent, the cause of peace, then we would
not be against the League,
10. I. V, Stalin, Sochineniia (Moscowo Gospolitizdat, 1951), Xm,4 280,
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It as primarily the French who, in the course of their negotiations with Moscow
in 1934, pressed for Soviet entry into the League. After some reluetance the Soviet
authorities consented, stressing that Soviet participation would change thae Laa.' s
character. The Soviet Union became a member of the League of Nations on September 18,
1934, and Maxim Litvinov, the persuasive Soviet foreign commisar who came to personify
the League's "collective security" endeavors of the next four years, that very day
explained to the Assembly the Soviet reasoning behind the adherence. Neither the
notion of an association of states nor peaceful coexistence among capitalist and
"socialist" countries was objectionable. As Litvinov carefully put it,
The idea in itself of an association of nations contains nothing theoaet-
ically inacceptable for the Soviet state and its ideolog. The Soviet Unigo
Is Itself a league of nations in the best sense of the w... W .The oviet
state bas never emoUded the possibility of som form oether of association
with states having a different political and social system, so long as
there is no mtual hostility and if it is for the attainment of comon
ai*n.... The Soviet Union it entering into the League today as representa-
tive of a new social-economic system, not renouncing any of its special
features and-liktithe other states reprelented here-preserving intact
its personality.
Here was the crux of the atter. So loag as Mosco; could "preserve intact its
personality," it was prepared to cooperate--and could only gain from doing so--
in the search for "oollective security."
Peace and security were the primary and perhaps sole Soviet objectives in the
League. As Litvinov declared in 1935, the Soviet Union had joined "with the sole
purpose and with the sole promise to collaborate in every possible way with other
,12nations in the maintenance of indivisible peace. Even in retrospect Moscow
makes no claim to have sought to promote international amity or cooperation. The
current Soviet for-sl is that the Soviet Union joined the League in order to
11. Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents an Foreign Policy 1917-1941 (London: Oxford
University Press, 193), 111, 92-93.
12. Cited in Tinothy A. Taraceusio, War and Peace in Soviet Diplomsoy (New York:
Macillan, 1940), p. 195.
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"utilize it as at least a certain hurdle on the aggressors' road to war
and as an international forum for exposing the aggressors and their
abettors." 13 It failed because "the principal capitalist countries, .
turned the League of Nations into a screen behind which the second World
War was prepared." 13a
*
130 I.F. Ivaohin, Borvba SSSR za mir i bezoasnost narodov (Moscowu Znanie,
1958), p. 7o Italics mine0
13a. Isvestia, June 26, 1959.
19
To the extent that the League's endeavors aimed at stemming aggressAon by
Germany, Italy, or Japan, the Soviet Union loyally cooperated, and Litvinov seemed
to be a model participant, pressing indeed for the delegation of greater autiority
to the League so as to enable it to enforce its decisionso The Soviet Union a lied
the arms embargo against Paraguay and' carried out economt sanctions against ItalX 1 4
However, its participation in the organization did not seem to involve any basic
change of attitudes.15 And its commitment inevitably grew more tenuous as the
League proved itself impotent on occasion after occasion and even appeasement proved
to be no answer. Poland, France, and Britain learned this in 1939, and Soviet
Russia did in 1941.
There is no evidence that Moscow had ever seriously considered the League a
"brake" on war. Over a variety of issues-from the Spanish Civil War to the treat-
ment of Germany in 1938--the strategy of cooperation with the "bourgeois democracies"
failed, as did the popular fronts themselves. By 1939 Moscow was again "going it
alone"-and going off eventually into the solitary encounter that resulted in the
German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23. Its secret clauses in effect
"ceded" Finland, along with Eastern Poland and the Baltic States, to the Soviet
Union, and it was in an attempt to implement this provision-.-and to bolster its
defensive position before Leningrad--that the Red Army invaded Finland on November
30, 1939. In December the League decided that this action constituted aggression
in the terms which Maxim Litvinov himself had helped define, and it excluded the
Soviet Union from membership. Seven months earlier Stalin had jettisoned Litvinov
as foreign commissar. The League had failed to prevent war, and Soviet efforts
14. It has beeh argued, however, that it fulfilled the letter but not the spirit
of the economic sanction agreement. See lorweU R.Tillett, "The Soviet Role
in League Sanctions against Italy." Amriean Slavic .d Ega Euroea n Review.
February 1956.
15. This is apparent, for instance, from current affairs commentaries in Irtar-
national _PrsA Corresoondence, the press service of the Comintern. The
Soviet Union joined many medical and some international communications and
transportation specialized organizations in addition to the League itself.
Of the over 100 humanitarian and religious organizations,- it joined only two;
of over forty in law ond administration also only two. (L. B. Schapiro, "Soviet
Participation in International Institutions, Yearbook of Uorli Affairs0 1949s
London. o 214, )
to make use of it to prevent aggression against itself had collapsed as part of
the total effort; indeed, once Stalin had convinced himself that the League had
failed--and that he would not ally himself with the Wlestern democracies under
existing conditions.-he made the outbreak of war inevitable by untying Hitler's
hands in signing the non-aggression pact'with Germany. For Moscow, the Geneva
experiment had been an unmerciful boomerang.
The Second World War: The Road to teUnited Nation
It is safe to say that Stalin gave little thought to the League in the years
following 1939. It was part of that general failure that characterized, in the
Soviet view, the "bourgeois" interwar system.1 6
The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 prompted a resumption of
Soviet cooperation with the West, leading soon to the formation of the wartime
alliance which in 1942 came to be known as the United Nations. In the Soviet view
the alliance had as its aim the prosecution of specific and limited aims, vast though
they were in cost and effort. centering on the defeat of the Axis powers. In the
course of the common war effort-or, more correctly, the simultaneous war efforts
in the east and west, fought virtually in separate compartments--no great intimacy
devoloped between the West and the Soviet Union, even though after 1942 Soviet
prestige abroad reached what was probably an unprecedented high, Moreover, the vie-
torious association with Roosevelt and Churchill ostensibly legitimized Stalin's
regime as a Great Power on the side of good0
After the taxing defeats and strains of the first two war years the allies
began to plan more systematically for the postwar world. The dissolution of the
Communist International in 1943 seemed to some Westerners to betoken the end of
the "two-world" outlook in Moscow and the reintegration of the new Russia into the
ranks of the "peace-loving" powers. Soviet propaganda surely contributed to this
&~ INow it was again called the "League of warmongers." (P, Lisovsky, Lisa 2odzhiaatelei
vnX, 4oscow, 19404)
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image. If the contours of the fundamental disagreements between Moscow and its
"Western" allies were not to unfold fully for severe more years, it was soon apparentj
however, that the Soviet leadership was thinking ahe d in terms far more concaste And
hardheaded, iore realistic, and more attuned to its f-interest than were the leBs
explicit thoughb similarly practical British and the ore luAay, more ideA i tc and
17
more confused American statesmen.
Talks on the nature of a desired international lgauization in the potar 'otld
led$ in October 1943, to the publication of a declatiLon by the Cxnferene of foreign
Ministers in Moscow. From here to San Francisco, one and one-half years ater the
road was long and perhaps thornier than any of the 2 g Three had envisagec. Since
the pre-natal course of the United Nations Organizanoun--over Dumbarton Oaks ane Yalta
has often been described, it will suffice here to sumarize Soviet attitudes on a few
matters.
(1) In the Soviet view the United Nations organimation, much like the Iuwe
and the wartime alliance, was to serve primarily the kPecific and relative y limited
objective of maintaining peace. It was not conceived as a "bridge" between different
systems of cultures; nor was it thought of as a first step on the road to loser uno
Soviet wartime spokesmen hinted that it was unreali# -"to to expect the future United
Nations to establish lasting, universal peace so lon, as conflicting socio-economic
and political systems existed. The common denominator of the Soviet and non-Soviet
camps, assuming cooperation among the powers, was the Soint commitment to prevent war
and aggiession.is
It followed from this that Moscow would frown ce the proliferation of institution
funcitions, and contacts under the aegis of the United Nations, Indeeds Moscow
17. See Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin , (Princeton University Pre V
This theme is well deveioped in Irene Blumenthe "The Soviet Union ia
a chapter IV.
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originally wanted an organization solely for the maintenance of peace. with no
provision for economic and social functions. 19 At Dumbarton Oaks the Soviet rep-
resentative argued that one of the reasons for the League's failure had been the
multiplicity of its tasks* Although he finally yielded on the inclusion of other
functions in the future United Nations, the Kremlin was not. and for another ten
years was not to be, interested in the many social0 economic, and cultural activ-
ities of the Organization,
(2) This limited view of the United Nations g future functions harmonized
with Moscow's insistence on the broadest interpretation
of national sovereignty on the part of all member nations (and Great Powers in par-
ticular); and on reserving for itself the greatest possible freedom of action.
The Soviet concept of sovereignty remained to be developed in the postwar
years; that of Great Power status became clear at an earlier date. At the Moscow
Conference in October 1943 the Soviet delegates stressed the concept of the "guid-
ing nucleus"-in substance similar to the Big Four (or Big Three) "policemen"
scheme of President Roosevelt. The special place befitting the Great Powers was
implicit in Stalin's pronouncements and outlook* Indeed, they inhered in his view
of power and his repeated stress that the realization of Leninism was "largely a
problem of power," There is enough substance in the numerous anecdotes of the "How
many divisions has the Pope?" variety to accept the view that Stalin felt that the
stronger states deserved special rights and had special obligationso At Yalta he
made fun of Albania (much as Khrushchev was to consider ludicrous the placement of
the Soviet Union on the same level as Luxembourg) and,, according to Stettinius,
19. Soviet memorandum to the U0 S. Department of State, "The International
Organization of Safety (1 0 eoc Security)," August 12, 1944, unpublished;
cited in Harold Karan Jacobson, "The Soviet Union and the Economic and
Social Activities of the United Nations," Doctoral dissertation0 Yale
University, 1955v po 2.
declared that "he would never agree to having any action of any of the Great Powers
submitted to the judgement of the small powers." 2 0
This position was semi-officially expounded in an article by "Malinin" (whom
diplomats in Ioscow considered to be the pseudonym of a Soviet foreign office
official) in the Aucust 1944 Zvezda. The League of Nations had failed, the author
insisted, for a variety of reasons but perhaps above all because it had been con-
ceived in sin.as one bloc of powers amassed against Soviet Russia. Harmony among
the Great Powers was essential for the success of a security organization, Malinin
continued, proceeding to outline the position subsequently taken at Dumbarton Oaks
and San Francisco..the need for a strong Security Council with unimpaired Great
Power sovereignty and veto power,2 1
It soon became clear that the Soviet Unidn was not prepared to delegate
decisions on any sort of enforcement action to any body in which it did not possess
veto power. In practice this reflected the deep-seated Soviet expectation (and
fear) of representing a minority position and risking being outvoted0 Hence
Soviet insistence on the veto mu3t be taken not as rooted in perversity but in a
firm and early determination on Moscow's part to make this a sine qua non of
Soviet participation. When Andrei Gromyko on September 18, 1944 told Secretary
Stettinius that "the Russian position on voting in the Council will never be
departed from," Stettinius countered that this might torpedo the United Nations,
Gromyko was prepared for this; he was ready to say that no world organization would
exist in which the Soviet Union (or any other major power) was denied the right to
vote in any dispute, even if it was a participant therein0 2 2
20o Edward Stettinius, %oosevelt and the Russians (Garden City: Doubleday, 1949), po 112.
21 The. E. 9s. Times, August 6 and 15~, 1944; 2|aada August 1944; Frederick C.
Barghoorn, Th§ Sove - L .t1.fe United States (New York: Harcourt$ Brace,
1950), po 98. On March 21, 1945 Radio Moscow declared that if the small countries
received equal votes, the United Nations would be much like the "ill-reputed"
League of Nations.
22. Robert Sherwood,, Roosvelt agnd Hookins (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 854-57.
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Iloscow was playing with fire in a peculiar way, Either Gromyko was bluffing-
expecting his oposite numbers to yield, as they had on other occasions; or else the
Kremlin did not think much of the United Nations and was prepared to do without it..
The same "take-it=or-leave-it" approach colored! Stalin's November 7,, 1944 speecb
"The actions of this world organizatione .will be effective if the Great Powers
which have borne the brunt of the :ar against Hitler Germany continue to act in a
spirit of annty d accord They will not be effective if this essential ..,on-
dition is violated." And again at Yalta, recalling Russia's exclusion from the Leaguez,
Stalin asked for "guaranteenthat this sort of thing will not happen againo "23
(3) .It followed that the Soviet Union evinced little interest and faith in
the futuro world organization,. Compared with its own direct action to achieve
security throug;h territ'orial expansion, military defeat of present enemies, socio-
economic nnd political transformation of the areas lying in what momed.rily was
a power vacuum,, and economic reconstruction and development~ -compared t6 all these
the United Nations was at best a second-rate "also-ran" in the Soviet stable of
political horses.
Stalin exhibited virtually no interest ir. the United Nations at the various
wartime conferences with the British and Americans. When the kAmbarton Oaks con-
ference left open the question whether procedural matters were subject to Great
Power veto ir the Security Council, the United States submitted to Stalin a voting
formula on December 5, 1944, At Yalt&a Secretary James F, &yrnes recalled , "I was
deeply disturbed by the clear evidence tha; Stalin had not con3dered or even read
our pro osal, Jf in those 63 days he had not familiarized himself with the subject.
he could not be greatly interested in the United Nations Organization-..
23> Winston Churchill, Tru=lh =DJ TraXedy (Boston: HoughLon Mifflin, 1953), pP. 356 '.5
24. James F, Byrnes, SpgkiM frafl.y (New York: Harper, 1?4?), 32 %
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At San Franciscoc three months later, H4olotov's absence was generally
interpreted "as a blunt confession that the Soviet government did not attach much
importance to the conference. This was a very serious blasting of the high hopes
.o that the peoples' representatives would actually build at San Francisco the
foundation for the permanent structure of world peace." Indeed, Stalin's shift to
cooperation in early June only confirms this verdict. After Molotov had prakved to
be recalc.trant to the point of permitting speculation whether he personally was
not prepared to torpedo the wnoja United Nationso Harry 'Hopkins was dispatched to
oscow to iron out the remaining difficulties in the voting formula After thr bit-.
terness of weeks of debate, it turned out that Stalin was simply unaware of thv
problemo The United States' record of the Hopkins interview with Stalin and Molotov
on June 6 makes it clear "that the Marshal had not understood the issues Involved
and had not had them explained to him. During this conversation 4arshal Stalin
remarked that he thought it was an insignificant matter"-and proceeded to yield to
the Western view that parties to a dispute, under Chapter VI, must abstain frcm
voting.25 Even at the subsequent London P-reparatory Cmission the Soviet delsgates
played a barely perfunctory part and seemed to attribute little importance to .. ts wotko
All th.s fitted in with Stalin's assessment of power.-and the realization that
the United Nations as an abstraction had none in measurable terms. It also fitted
in with the Soviet preference for bilateralism based on Moscow0  Even before the
United Nations was established, 4oscow had sponsored the Free Germany Gommittt
the Union of Polish patriots, and other refugee committees; it had concluded an
alliance with Czechoslovakia and was negotiating with other exile grou-s Its
plans for early action,-by its own forces and resources, and by loil Communistt--
throughout East-Central Europe were well along by 1943. Clearly the overwhelming
Soviet emphasis lay outside the framework of any future world- organization.
Moscow was rather outspoken0 even at the time of the San Francisc conferece,
25, Sherv-ood0 22_,_ejd , ppo 875-76 910-120
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in its preference for direct commitments. Tne peoples had suffered too much to
pin their hopes on the United Nations,. it declared; hard-and-fast bilateral
treaties were far more tangible warrants of peace, 2 6  Yet the Soviet Union went
along, worked along_, and made a variety of concessions in the proceas of hammering
out the United Nations Charter,
On the negative side of the ledger,, it preferred-=then and later--to join in
so as to avoid non-participation which might make the body a hostile camp, Provided
with the vetoq the Soviet Union was certain that the United Nations could not be
used against it, Moreover, the onus o'' self-exclusion from the organization would
have been severe indeed, Beyond thia, Moscow in all likelihood considered the
United Nation as probably useful in reinforcing the network of direct controls
and bilateral agreements which it was rapidly weaving,, And it certainly welcomed
it as a f orum for the dissemination of Soviet opinion.. Finally it may well have
viewed. the United Nations as the institutional symbol of the recognition of the
Soviet Union as one of the Big Three, So long as "Great Power unanimity" was
accepted, it had nothing to lose-and perhaps something to gain.,
The Soviet Union signed the Charter with a more cynical but more realistic
assessment of the United Nationsa capacities and prospects than many of its fellow-
membersa Ideological and power-political considerations-and the experience of
earlier years-combined to make the United Nations at beat an ancillary instrument
of Soviet foreign poliy,.
2. War ai'd the Wrin Class (Moscow), March 15, 1945,
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The Soviet Union in the United Nations:
The First Decade
One may usefully identify three major phases in the development of Mloscow's
policy toward the United Nations. That policy, which has never been an independent
variable but consistently a by-product of more general Soviet strategies, has in
its broad features followed the zigzags of declining cooperation, cold war and
Korean War, and limited "thaw."
Conflict
Soviet conduct from the end of the second World lar to the blossoming of the
"cold war" some three years later refledted a reinfusion of Communist orthodoxy,
militancy, and Party control. Outside.the Soviet Union these years saw the extension
and consolidation of Soviet predominance over Eastern Europe--and failure to secure
control over Northern Iran, 4anchuria, and the West German economy. The revival
of the "two-camp" view of the world in Soviet propaganda implied the expectation
of new conflicts with "capitalists." Paradoxically, the unique accretion in
Communist power--from "socialism in one country" to the "world system" of ten or
more Communist states--took place at a time of domestic weakness due to the ravages
of war and at a time of relative international weakness due to the American monopoly
of the atomic bomb0 Joviet foreign policy was designed to take advantage of the
opportunities-primarily the power vacuums created by the defeat of Germany and
Japan--without exposing itself to undue risks at a time of reconstruction and
reconsolidation.
In 1944 Moscow had told the French Communists not to revolt or to seize power,
but in 1947-with the Italian and French Communist parties out of the coalition gov-
ernments, the Truman Doctrine proclaimed, and the "cold war" exacerbated.-the Com-
inform was established and its leaders privately urged a more militant course on
the west European and South Asian parties. The break with Tito and Soviet refusal
to accept Marshall Plan aid tended only to deepen the gulf between what was coming to
be called East and West.
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Jhile Stalin clearly endeavored to drain the maximum benefit from the remain-
ing reservoir of "great power amity," he never seemed to have had any doubt about
the basic choice before him. He opted for the extension of Soviet predominance at
the expense of "friendship" abroad0 Security by territorial accretion ( and the
concomitant socio-economic transformations that it involved) went hand in hard with
the sincere belief in Russia's communizing mission and in ultimate world-wide victory.
To Stalin such an orientation was both logical and historically preferable to the
cultivation of good will with states which by their economic and political interests
were bound to be unreliable friends and, in all likelihood, would sooner or later
line up against the Soviet Union,
Important for the shaping of Soviet attitudes toward the United Nations in
these formative years, then, is the spirit of suspicion and self isolation, the
reliance on the Soviet Union's own strength rather than on joint international
action, and the withdrawal from even the limited give-and-take that had character-
ised the wartime conferences of the Big Three,
The Soviet attitude after San Frapcisco was a mixture of hope and skepticism.
At a time when both camps tried to maiptain the appearances of amity (and many of
the issues dividing tiem had not yet become apparent), Moscow seems to have hoped
for a more successful or powerful position for itself in the United Nationso Per-
haps the Iranian complaint about Soviet occupation and interference in domestic
affairs and the overwhelmingly anti-Soviet sentiment generated in the ensuing debates
contributed to a crystallization of Soyiet sentiment and strategy. By March 1946
Stalin felt compelled to reassert that (in spite of Soviet defiance and "walk-out")
the United Nations was a "serious instrument for the preservation of peace0 "' Yet
in fact Moscow had tasted the bitter fruit of leading an apparently static bloc
1 Stalin, interview with Associated Press correspondent Eddie Gilmore, March 10, 1946,
See also Richard Van Wagenen, TA Ir a M (New York: Carnegie Endowment
U. N. Action Case Histories, 1952).
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of five or six delegates (Soviet Union, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia) which was invariably outvoted0 World opinion seemed to sway with
the United Nations majority, impervious to Soviet claims to be defending the organ-
ization against hostile onslaughts.
The crux of the problem as it now unfolded was the fact that--unlike the Holy
Alliance o- League of Nations -- the United Nations was established before a new
balance of power had been attained,2 Moscow was striving to devise techniques to
reduce the anti-Soviet majority, to clip its wings, so to speak, and accordingly
to insist on a strict and literal construction of the United Nations Charter, which
it had endorsed and accepted. As more and more areas of friction became visible,
Moscow insisted on the careful observance of "great power unanimity" and sovereign
rights of all member states as conditions of effective U.N. operation. Only under
"certain conditions" was "fruitful cooperation quite possible." Such statements
concealed the Soviet view that (as Moscow later averred) an "activization of aggressive
forces" took place at the United Nations as early as 1945o
As early as the -work of the first session of the Assembly (a Soviet
commentary explains] it became clear that two distinct courses were
being pursued in the United Nations: the Soviet Union and the democratic
countries supporting it in full accord with the Charter strove for
the adoption of decisions aimed to strengthen peace and the author-
ity of the United Nntions; the ruling circles of the USA on the contrary
2,, Hans J. Mlorgenthau, Politics Amona NAtions (New York: Knopf, 1956), p, 450o
and Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Evolution _o ievolution? (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press0 1957), po 14.
31 New Times (Moscow). 1947, no0 1 p, lo
There is some indication that Moscow wos not from the outset prepared to laugh
off the whole organization, even though Stalin was relatively flexible when the
terms of the United Nations had to be settled in terms of greater politicail issue3.
-ot only the desire for multiple votes (discussed below), but also the demand, for
instance, that a Soviet national fill the premier Assistant Secretaryship was
an index of seriousness of intentions. Trygve Lie (oo0 cit., pp. 45-46) relates
how he suggested Alexei Roshchin, whom he had known froni London, for this position8
Andrei Vyshinsky instead proposed Arkady Sobolev, who had attended the Dumbarton
Oaks conference and had been political advisor to Marshal Zhukov.
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intended to subordinate the United Nations to the aims of their policy,
opposing the fulfillment by the United Nations of the tasks intended 4or it
by the Charter, and thereby weakening its authority and significance.
The bipolar world was a reality, and Moscow was determined to "exploit and
sharpen" the "contradictions" which it assumed existed within the capitalist fold--
conflicts between different "imperialist" powers, such as the United States and
United Kingdom, conflicts between colonies and mother countries, and conflicts
within any capitalist state0
Such Soviet attempts through the United Nations may be classified in several
categories. Some aimed at identifying the Soviet Union with the leadership of
"progressive causes." Thus its (and the Polish) delegation led the way in a con-
demnation of Franco Spain (leading, after a double veto in the Security Council,
to the adoption of a somewhat similar resolution in the General Assembly). Likewise,
attacks on racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa were calculated to
make the Soviet Union the spokesman for "decent" principles.
More widespread and more lasting were Soviet efforts to identify itself with
anti-Western, anti-imperialist. or anti-capitalist campaigns. Thus the Ukrainian SSR
brought the Indonesian case before the Security Council, 16dging a complaint about
the British use of Japanese troops and requesting the restoration of peace under
UN auspices.5 Likewise, the Soviet bloc sided with Egypt and the Sudan against
Britain, and with Syria, Lebanon, and North Africa against France. in the several
cases involving these regions0
All these cases were later described by Moscow as having been supported in
def enee of national sovereignty. The same rationale was provided for the Soviet
stand on the Greek dispute. Rather characteristically, the Soviet delegation found
4. Sergei Samarsky, Bor'ba Sovetskogo Soiuza v OON za mir i bezopasnost'
narodov, (Moscow, 1956), p. 13.
5. The subsequent Soviet votes against the Indonesian settlement were apparently
due to an attempt to embarrass the West by charging that United States and
Netherlands interests continued to maintain a "stranglehold" on the Indonesian
economy and hence politics. See also J. F. Collins, "United Nations and Indo-
nesia," International Conciliation, vol, 459 (1950)-
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counter-charges the most effective means of neutralizing hostile allegations.
After turning down Soviet charges ogainst Greece and Britain, the Security Council
in December 1946 vote'd to investigate complaints against Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and
Albanian interference in the Greek civil war. But while the majority of the invest-
igating commission found the three budding "people's democracies" guilty of assisting
the Greek rebels, its Soviet and Polish members found fault with the Greek author.
ities only (with the Soviet delegate casting five vetoes and refusing to transfer the
issue to the General Assembly), Moscow was later to charge that the decisions on
the reports of the §alkan Commission as well as those on Korea (at the 2d Session
of the Assembly) were "illegal."
It may be well to add that the Soviet stance was not always well thought out
or consistent. The priority of attention in M1oscow during the early postwar years
(also indicative of the Soviet perception of the United Nations as a secondary arena
of contest)seems to have involved neglect of certain areas where Soviet interests
were less. seriously involved. Such a lack of definition is apparent in Soviet for-
eign policy toward Southeast Asia in 1945-48; and it is reflected at the United
Nations, for instance, in the Soviet abstentions (or voting with the majority)
in the Kashmir dispute. Moreover, the Soviet opposition to the terms (acceptable
to the Djakarta authorities) by which the Indonesian dispute was settled reflected
a dogmatic re-evaluation of colonial revolutions in Moscow', which had led to the
temporary rejection of "bourgeois nationalism" as treacherous and of independence
as fictitious, Doctrinal rigidity-and political consequences stemming from it,
such as the round of iit-ed revolts throughout Southeast Asia in 1948.-
thus made it impossible for the Soviet Union to capitalize to the fullest on the
potential political op)ortunitiese
Finally, on certain issues M1oscow's stand wavered. Thus, with regard to
PaleLtine the Soviet Union was consistent only so far as its anti-British object-
ives were concerned, otherwise joining the United States in supporting the UTISCOP
6. See, g Joseph Korbel, "The Kashi3r Disputn and the- Unite ie tOrgnization, May
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partition plan but striving to avoid alientaing the Arab world. 7
Everything considered, Soviet propaganda efforts--in the broadest political sense--
were not utter successes. On various key issues, from the Greek Civil War to the Berlin
blockade, the onus of public opinion--in and out of the United Nations--was on the Soviet
Union and its dependencies. In general the Soviet attitude in the United Nations tended
to be a product of the shifting parallelogram of forces outside the United Nations. The
Soviet position was complicated by the fact that on certain issues Moscow stood for the
status quo while on others it opposed it. Actually, as Professor Triska has pointed out,
the formula behind Soviet policy was relatively obvious. Where its own interests and
position tended to benefit from change--as in Iran, Greece, Berlin, or China--Moscow
(in and out of the United Nations) favored change. It also favored change where the effect
of change was a setback for the capitalist West (Indonesia, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine,
Italian colonies, Egypt,,North Africa). When the Soviet Union or one of its allies was
accused or attacked (Corfu, Korea, eiit of Soviet wives), on the other hand, it rallied
to the defense of sovereignty and the status guo (which, Moscow was ready to claim, Were
screens for abuse in the case of Spain or South Africa) 0 8
By 1948 the situation in the United Nations substantially mirrored the general
drift toward world tension and "cold var."
Crisis
The attention paid by the Soviet Union to the possibility of withdrawing from mem-
bership in the United Nations has been markedly greater than that of other powers. Indeed,
it has been the only member repeatedly to stress the legality of leaving. At San Francisco
it was Gromyko who insisted on an explicit interpretation of membership in this sense.
7- See Oles Smolansky, "The Soviet Union and the Arab States, 1947-1957," Doctoral
Dissertation, Columbia University, 1959.
8. Triska, op. cit. p. 291. See alos Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy in the United
Nations w-Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science (New York), Vol. XXII,
January 1947, pp. 28-37.
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In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, one cannot condemn beforehand the motives
which may compel a State to use its right
32
to leave the Organization, This right is the expression of State sovereignty..0 "
Since the Soviet Union was clearly not eager to prepare a face-saving exit for one
of its potential enemies, this statement is of considerable interest in confirming
the hypothesis that, as early as San Francisco, Moscow anticipated international
crises which might oblige the Soviet Union to pull out.
Such statements-as will be shown-were to be repeated in the following years.
Particularly during the period of most complete deterioration of Soviet-United
Nations relationships, 199-53, did the Soviet Union seem on several occasions to
be cn the verge of pulling out, What was the purpose behind such statements?
They could have been intended to stress the voluntary and dissoluble nature of the
United Nations, to underscore the imperfections of its operations, which might
force some members to abandon it, to prepare "public opinion" for such a departure,
or to warn the United Nations' majority to mend its ways. Finally, one may
speculate whether a muted dialogue was not being conducted within Soviet ranks
between advocates of continued Soviet operation in the United Nations, frustrating
though it might be, and spokesmen of the "left" intransigent wing of the Party
(temporarily victorious in 1947-48), favoring a go-it-alone policy, much in the
nature of the Sixth Comintern Congress program of 1928 and now momentarily repre-
sented by Andrei Zhdanov, Marshal Tito, and others. There are enough suggestions
of such a debate behind the scene and some firm evidence of a left-right split
at this time over other issues in- international Communism to support such an
hypothesis, Moreover, such a division would be entirely consistent with the
traditional split in Communist ranks between purists and realists, ultra-leftist
"self.isolationsists" and moderate united-fronters,
9,. Andrei Gromyko, remarks of June 25, 1945; cited in World Todaz (london),
January 1948, p. 15a
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In early 1949 the official attitude, according to a prepared statement of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry on January 29, 1949, was still one of continued participation:
Every one sees that the United NMtions Organization is being
undermined, since this organization at least to a certain extent
hampers and curbs the aggressive circles in their policy of aggression
and unleashing a new war. In view of this situation the Soviet Union
has to struggle with even more firmness and persistance against the
undermining and destruction of the United Nations Organization by ag-
gressive elements and their accomplices, and must see to it that the
United Nations Organization does not connive with such elements as is
often the case nowoo,
Yet in fact the Soviet Union and the increasingly sovietized satellites began to
disengage themselves from United Nations activities, particularly of course during
the period of voluntary Soviet absence between January and August 1950 over the
question of seating a Chinese representative, During the subsequent years of the
Korean war Soviet participation continued often to be iore token than real. More
and more the Soviet image was one of the United Nations doomed, reduced either to
futility or to an enemy tool,
One analyst who examined the record of Soviet propaganda in this period concludes:
Probably the strongest and most persistent theme of Soviet propaganda was
that the Western powers, led by the United States, wish to undermine the
United Nations. This argument emerged as soon as the conflict between East
and vest broke into the open. It increased in sharpness and bitterness as
the political situation deteriorated; since 1949, it took frequently the form
of accusations that the West actually wanted to destroy the United Nations0
Towards the end of our period 19513 indications were given in Soviet
propaganda that the United Nations, despite all Soviet efforts to save it,
was in fact already doomed and inl he process of disintegration because of
machinations of the imperialists.
Indeed, the legality of leaving was stressed even after the crisis had passed.
Thus the summary article on the United Nations appearing in the revised edition of
the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (signed February 1955) singled out the members'
right to withdraw from the Organization--a right0 though not explicitly in the
10. Leopold Laufer, "Soviet and American Domestic Propaganda on the U0 N. Unanimity
principle," Russian Institute Certificate Essay. Columbia University, 1951, po 89,
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Charter, confirmed by a special committee resolution adopted at San Francisco011
In actual practice. Poland and Czechoslovakia withdrew from UNvSC 0o Bulgaria.
Hungary, and 'Rumania as non-members refused to discuss charges. levetred in the
General Assembly, of having violated human rights guaranteed in the peace treaties
signed by them. (Bulgaria and Albania, though non-members, had in the preceding
period willingly testified before the United NationsO) Non-participation was equally
striking in commercial affairs. "What constructive work was done by the United
Nations concerning international trade was the result of cooperation solely among
the non-Soviet stateso Soviet abstention from these activities was complete."12
Finally, the Communist German Democratic Republic in 1952 refused access to the
UN adho commission to investigate conditions precedent to all German free elections-
as North Korea had earlier and Hungary was to do four years later in the case of
other UN commissions.
In 1949 the Soviet Union began to invoke an additional argument that strained
the ties still further. In the face of USo efforts to cement military alliances
in the non-Soviet world, Moscow proclaimed the incompatibility of membership in
the United Nations--by definition, "peace-loving"--with participation in "aggres-
sive" blocs like European Defense Community or North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Vyshinsky, ostensibly defending the Charter,, declared:
The principles and aims of the United Nations require po explanation
on our part--they are clearly stated in the Charter signed in San Francisco
in June 19450 dut it is enough to compare these goals and tasks of the
United Nations as expressed in the Charter, with the activity of
the Atlantic bloc 0 ..to convince oneself of the utter incompatibility
of participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc with membership in
ll Bol'shaia sov_etskia ents L 2d revo edo (Moscow, 1955), XXXI0 145.
12* qarold K. Jacobson, "The Soviet Union, the UN and World Trade,* Wesern
Political Ju yarry September 1958, p. 681.
the United Nations. 1 3
One may surmise, however, that the purpose of this double-edged sword was to
wreck ATC and its analo;;s, not to destroy the United Nations. For, after all
is said and done, the Soviet Union remained in the United Nations even when the
latter was waging war on its allies, stooges, and friends.
Once again the effect of changes wrought in the operation of the United Nations
was to weaken the ability of the Soviet bloc to throw obstacles in the path of
the non-Communist majority--and once again Moscow resisted all such changes,
sticking to the letter of the Charter* This was true of the "Uniting-for-Peace"
resolution, which permitted the majority to by-pass the veto-bound Security Council.
the extension of Secretary-General Lie's term of offrice, over Soviet opposition,
and various proposals to circumscribe or eliminate the requirements of "great power
unanimity."
The Soviet "walk-out" of January 1950 over the Chinese question thus came
in an atmosphere already heavily laden with charges and counter-charges. For over
a year, the Soviet Union and its friends had prepared alternatives to the United
Nlations-a narrow and rigid one in the Communist Information Bureau (Cominforml unit-
ing nine national parties; and a far more effective, appealing, and diffuse one in
the World Peace Council and the World Congress of Portisans of Peace, explicitly
played up as an alternative to the United Nations. Coinciding with the ambitious
"peace pact" and various disarmament proposals sulbitted to the Fourth session of
the General Assembly (and the simultaneous Soviet announcement that the Soviet
Union had mastered the secrets of the atom), the many-faceted "peace" campaign was
13. Andrei Vyshinsky, speeches of November 8, 1951 (General Assembly) and January 12,
1952 (Political Committee), in his ]Eourosy meZhdunrodnoo 2rgaya ;L mezhdunarodnoi
l k vol. III (Moscow: Gosurizdat, 1952), pp. ?4, 320. On November 2?, 1953,
Soviet delegate P. D. rorosov spoke in the Assembly of the "current serious crisis
in the United Nations...now degraded to the role of an appendage of the iorth Atlantic
bloc," ( of the American Academy, vol. 296, November 1954, p. 147-)
14. See the stimulating article by Rupert Emerson and Inis L. Claude, "The Soviet
Union and the United Nations," 2p1 cit pp. 14, 25--26.
36
intended -as a mass movement with literally "hundreds of millions" of endorsements.
counte"posing the "rank and file" of the world there represented against the majority
of United Nations delegations .speaking for no one but narrow "ruling circles."15
Soviet reasoning behind the absence of its delegates from the Security Council
when the iKorean conflict broke out on June 25v 1950 has been amply debated--without
definitive solution. "hatever the original Soviet intent--a face-saving device for
disengagement from UN activities, or dramatic support for Communist China0 or an
attempt to demonstrate that the will of the Soviet Union could not be ignored with
impunity-by Iay 1950 the Chinese membership question seemed well on its way toward
a solution. But in all likelihood this had not been the central stimulus for the
Soviet walkout. Trygve Lie, who saw Stalin in inid-M4ay, relates how in all their
talks "Stalin had not uttered a word" on the senting of Communist China, And to
Lie's efforts to impress on Stalin the value of the United Nations Stalin "said
little in answer. Recalling that the Soviet Union had been one of the founders of
the United Nations, he remarked, 'We will try to do everything we can to work along
a course determined by our own and the world's best interests.'"16 In Stalin's
terms, this was a statement typically cautious and leaving open the possibility of
a Soviet break.
It is probably safe to say that M0oscow had anticipated neither the protracted
warfare that resulted from the North Korean invasion of the south nor the "inter-
vention" of the United Nations. The same sedulously cultivated optimism--faith
in history and time as allies of Coimmunism and the Soviet Union-which had led Stalin
into other blundprs was apparent once again. It was compounded by Stalin's scorn
for the small and weak-as with Finland in 1939.-and his faith in the efficacy of
demonstrations of force--as in the case of Tito* The same view of "power" on the
15. See also Oleh -edyshyn, "Soviet Attitudes toward the United Nations.a
1945-1955 o" EatEr ogim gProgblns. (New York) 0 II (1957), pp, 14-15-
16. Lie,, 2g.. pp. 229, 267.
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world scene as the corporeal product of material resou-rces, manpower, and organization
led him to continue to view the United Nations as nothing significant to reckon with.
It seems most plausible to surmise that this basic failure to take the United
Nations seriously as an obstacle on the road to aggression combined with a failure
of coordination at the highest Soviet decision-making levels--i.e., between the
organs responsible for broad policy in Korea and Soviet strategy at the United
Nations-to keep the Soviet delegates away from the United Nations when the emer-
gency session was convened on June 25, 1950.17 If this is so, Soviet failure--in
the form of UN action in Korea was to a large extent home-madet Stalin was the
victim of his own concept of power, It did Mioscow little good thereafter to insist
that the Security Council action was "illegal" because two of its five members (the
Soviet Union and, in the Soviet reading, Communist China) were not present. On
July 27 Yakov Malik informed Trygve Lie tha t, in accordance with the monthly rota-
tion of the Security Council presidency, he would assume the chair on August 1.
On that date the Soviet delegation returned.
Stalin was obviously aware of the setback the UN action constituted--and also
the further defeat represented by the General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951,
branding the Chinese Communists as aggressors. He felt called upon to retort bit-
terly that the United Nations had become "an instrument of aggressive war," having
"ceased to be an international organization of nations enjoying equal rights. The
United Nations is now not so much a world organization as an organization for the
Americans, an organization acting on behalf of the requirements of the American
aggressors." He concluded with another threat: "The United Nations Organization
17. An alternative but not necessarily conflicting interpretation would be a conscious
Soviet decision not to tip its hand by having the Soviet delegation return prior
to the Korean operation. At any rate, Moscow clearly expected to have the latter
completed before long. One writer claims to know that there were indications that
various Soviet delegates to UN organs expected to return by September 1950.
(William R. Kintner, "The Soviet Union 's Use of the U"', p. 24a ) See also Leland
Goodrich, Korea (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956).
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is therefore taking the inglorious road of the League of Nations. In this way
it is burying its moral prestige and dooming itself
38.
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to disintegrationo " Indeed, Soviet press comrent in the following weeks spoke
with unprecedented bluntness in "either-or" terms of the United Nations.
And still the Soviet Union did not pull out, In addition to sugg.esting a'
measure of caution and calculation that belies the image of Soviet action as
entirely irrational in these last, erratic years of Joseph Stalin, the decision
(like the decision for the Soviet Union not to become directly involved in the
Korean f!ighting ) was baised, no doubt, on an assessment of what it stood to gain
and lose from leaving the United Nations. E7verything considered, it lost nothing
from membership; certainly the presence on !East River imposed no inhibitions on
Soviet officialdom and policy-makerso By staying in, the Soviet tnion was not
cutting itself off from the rest of the world --not only from the "imperialist" foe,
that is, but also from the custbmarily uncommitted, whom it sought to woo 0  Oy stay -
ing in, it kept an opportunity to discu:s, negotiate, and feel out.-and the February
1949 ialik-Jessup talks that had paved the way to ending the Berlin Blockade
impasse sugi;ested the mutual utility of such opportunities By staying in, the
Soviet Union kept a well-attended, well-publi.cized forum to air its views--which,
nfter all, had been one of the virtues of memership as Moscow conceived it, Lastly
by staying in the Soviet Union avoided the stigma of having slammed a door which
at some future date it might wish to reopen.
Thus the Soviet Union managed to have its cake and eat it too. But, if its
strategy was astute, it also involved the Soviet Union in costly adventure Above
all, it permitted the uniting of the non-Communist world around the United Nations0
By 1951 the Soviet bloc was virtually an outcast--an enemy anomalously unnamed and
continuing to sit amidst those who voted for the military and political operations
they were jointly waging against the Soviet Union's dependents and allies,
18. The New York Times, February 17, 1951,
"Coexist ence
The ups and downs in the Soviet view of=-and position at--the United Dations
have been predomi nantly a function of other policy decisions, Just as the Korean
war was not planned (og even thought through) in terms of the United Nations, so
the improvement and relaxation that ensued touched the United Nations by indirection.
Bit the new and peculiar music emanating from Moscow was to find its echoes on the
East River, too,
One can point to various causes and stimuli to explain the "turning point" in
Soviet conduct which we are about to discuss. There were some harbingers prior to
Stalin's death--the appoeal to colonial and national movements at the 19th Congress
of the C"SU in October 1952; the international economic conference in Moscow; and
in January 1953 Soviet agreement (after years of refusal) to join in trade consult-
19
ations with the Economic Council for Europe, as suggested by Gunnar Myrdal,
There is more evidence that Stali.es death, on March 5, 1953, freed the hands and
minds of his would-be successors and permitted them to chart and rethink the course
of Soviet )olicy so as to extract the Soviet orbit from the sterilities, obsolescence,
andl ideosyncraciea of the Stalin era without sacrificing the power position abroad,,
And finally, one can point to the spring and summer of 1955 as the beginnings of
the "Khrushchev era," Whatever the balance of these contributing factors, they had
V: L-eact on the Soviet Unidn at the United Nations ,
The total change is indeed remarkable if one compares Soviet stat*re and behavior
as of 195) with the ostracism of 1952* As late as 1956 as realistic an observer
as Ilans J, Mor.;enthau could write that "in its relations with the Soviet bloc the
20
the new United Nations is a grand alliance opposing another grand alliance." In its
19 Ray L, Thurston, of the Department of State, has stated that "even before Stalin's
death, vitriolic criticism of American ranir4l policies had been toned down in
Soviet discussions in the United Natiois. It has been noted that a change of
Soviet personnel has occurred; there is more geniality " (C Grove Haines, ei.
* Tareat of soviet Impgerialis, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1954", pp>, 11p-19,)
20, Hans J,. MorgenthrA~ae aqp cJ4o po 464 ,
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new phase Soviet policy has striven to demonstrate, assert, and reaffirm its
affinity for the United Nations in various ways.
The first opportunity (along with the election of a new Secret ary-General) was,
naturally enough, the termination of the Korean war. The protracted negotiations
that had left the prisoner-of-war question unresolved led, a month after Stalin's
death, to the acceptance of the Indian compromise formula and on June 27 to cessation
of hostilities. Almost sinaltaneously--and apparently constituting an elaboration
of economic feelers begun during preceding months.-the Soviet Union for the first
21time contributed to and joined the work of the UN Technical Assistance Program2
Yet the real "thaw" was yet to come. After an outwardly quiescent 1954
(concealing a bitter fight behia: the Kremlin facade, as we now know), Nikita
Khrushchev (with Nikolai Bulganin as his temporary frontman) replaced Georgii Mal-
enkov and promptly embarked on a series of hasty moves at home and abroad to achieve
a measure of relaxation without shattering the totalitarian controls. After hes-
itant overtures in 1954, 4ay 195 saw tne resumption of serious talks on disar-
mament and nuclear controls for .he first time in some seven years, The timing
so closely coincided with the establishment of Soviet diplomatic relations with
Uest Germany and Japan, the signing of the Austrian peace treaty, and the improve-
ment of Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and Finland that it seems clear that the proposal
was part of an ambitious and systematic strategy, One may suggest that sometime
in early spring of 1955 a series of policy decisions was adopted in Moscow, includ-
ing the necessity of capitalizing on the United Iations! It is known from
214 See Alvin Z, Rubinstein, "Soviet Policy in ECAFE, " International Organization
7ol. XII (1958% no. 4, po 465,
'The Soviet Union joined UNESCO on April 21, 1955. Perhaps the move is an indication
of a policy decision preceding it by some days or weeks.
J
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other sources that at the July 1955 ?ienum of the Central Committee of the CSU
Khrushchev recapitulated the new strategy-in substance a determination to wage
"peaceful coexistence," i.e., avoiding war, holding the line in Europe, but tak-
in- maximum advantage of the underdeveloped areas, which were now bracketed with
the Soviet orbit as a new "zone of peace." It is in this light that the present
writer sees the Soviet endeavor, since 1955, to transform the United Uations, in
the long run, into a serviceable instrument of the "socialist camp," 2 2
Suddenly the tone of Soviet comentary on the United Nations changed. As
late as February 1955 Uoscow argued not only that the United Nations was born in
the feud of two conflicting conceptions-that of the Soviet Union (peaceful) and
that of the West (imperialist)-but also that the United States had tried to make
the United Nations a tool of aggression against the Soviet Union and the people's
democracies. "Full responsibility" for the "illegal" UN sctions remained squarely
23with the United States and its allies. Yet a few months later Moscow could
argue (through the mouths of two prominent international lawyers) that the United
Nations had been based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Without fully
ignoring the negative features in its work (as Moscow saw them), a collection- of
documents on the United Nations.-itself a new departure in Russia--emph.asized the.
"positive facets" of its work.24
The 10th Session of the General Assembly in 1955 was the object of unusually
favorable Soviet press comment. 4osco.z hailed the end of American "push-button
majorities," the admission of sixteen new members as a reflection of "positive"
Soviet policy, and the increasingly successful Soviet leadership of "peace forces"
22. On the July Plenum, see Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet Stake in Eastern Europe,"
Arnals of the American Academy, Vol- 317, May 1958, pp. 142-43.
23. Bol'shaia, op. cit0 ,XXXI, 144, 146.
24. V. N. Durdenevskii and S. D. Krylov, 2Organizatsiia Ob'edinennykh Uatsii:
sbornik dokumentov (Ioscow: Gosiurizdat, 1956), p- 3.
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in the world, 2 5
-ir .l that the Hungarian crisis..-and the severe setback it involved for
the Soviet Union at the United Nations-temporarily put in question this increasinrly
enthusiastic motif But it was balanced, after all, by the Suez action, so that
the score was evened and ioscow could comm=ent that "Time will show whether the
Unite6 Nations will muster the strength to accomplish the tasks entrusted to it
by mankcind." 2U.thin & few month3 the Unrigarian experience receded into the back-
ground, and the Soviet press resumed its attempts to make Moscow the main champion
and le ender of the United Uations and the principles it stands or.
Perhaps for the firat titw since the creation of the UN, Soviet policy at the highest
level explicit1y, and no by indirection, aimed At exploiting the new potential..
much in the fashion of earlier attempts to permeate "front organizations,," On
11arch 2' 1956,S meeting in Uoscov deoided to establish a United Nations-Assoc-
iation in the Soviet Union-.an unmistakable index of the new Soviet "line." In
3eptember of that year the World Federation of United nations Associations accepted
the Sc:viet Union as a member and placed the chairman of the Soviet group, histor,.
27
ian Anna Pankratova (a loyal Party veteran) on its Executive0  By July 1957
Professor Eugene iKorovini, a leadin; Soviet specialist On international relations
and international law, covld deliver a talk pushing the new "line" even further.,
He claimed that the Soviet Unibn "had priority" among the -reat powers in establish-
ing tne United hations, that the Soviet Union had initiated both the Moscov Con-
ference of 1943 and the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944 and that the Soviet
Union had introduced a number of specific e.ements in the U Charter which had
determined its spirit (though the examples cited hardly provided a convincing
25. V.  :-anenev and L Korin, "The Results of the 10th Session of the General
Assembly," Internatin Affalrs (s8cow)Q 1956, no, 1, pp. 27-40.
26 3aturin,, "The 11th Session of the U.14 General rs-embly, " (jbli i 1957,
nos 1, po 108,
7, See Laternational g r (MoScow) , 1956 no. 6 p -657-60 and noI i p
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listing)o All in all, he was prepared to argue that
the constant growth of Soviet economic and defensive might. of the
moral authority of the USSR, the merger of the entire socialist
camp on the basis of proletarian inter-nationalism and its growing
strength, the support of its international policy by the partisans
of peace throughout the world vividly testify to the fact that the
realization of the democratic principles of the UN Charter becomes
increasingly the unanimous demand of all peaceloving humanity0 28
Here was a characteristic formulation, indicative--for all its verbiage--
of the new Soviet self-image, its "position of strength" and its attempts to
identify itself with and lead the proponents of peace and the "democratic principles"
of the United Nations. For better or for worse, the changed perception of Soviet
opportunities was not without basis in fact.
28, E. A. Korovin, "Sovetskii Soiuz i- sozdanie Organizatsii Ob'edinennykh Natsii,"
in Voprosv vnehnei nolitiki SSSR k q Cmnyjh mezhdunarodnykh anohenii
(oscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958), pp. &_-V
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IV
SOVIET ATTTJDE AE D $7I R: SM Y 3L'S
National Severei1nt v
The Soviet notion of sovereignty has undergone drastic reconsideration in
the years since the hussian Revolution. Initially it was considered part of the
bourgeois parr hernalia that had no room in a world where "the proletorint has
no fatherland," But the beginnings of an espousal of sovereignty are apparert 4s
early as 191? in Lenirnas shift from "defeatism" to "defensism" the day after seiz-
ing power and in the persistent protest against foreign intervention in 2ussia in
1918-1919. As the Soviet stpte became stronger, it could insist more and more firmly
and vociferously that it would tolerate no infringement of its national sovereignty.
or, for that matter, of that of other victims of the imperialist lest,
To 7e sure, the Soviet leaders reserved to themselves the right to impinge,
through the medium of the Communist International, on what other states mi-ht con.
sider their sovereign rights. M4oreover, as leading theorists of law (such as
Kozhevnikov and Korovin) asserted down to at least 1930, the slogan of the inter-
national working class was not national sovereignty but proletarian dictatorship,
And, perhaps most important, the concept of sovereign rights turned out to be as
manipulative and political in application Ps other concepts in Soviet (domestic
as well as international) law. On occasion Moscow has condemned the recourse to
sovereign prerogatives by others who attempted to shirk international obliations
Thus Litvinov in 1936 attacked those who sought to evade enforcement of Le&gue' of
Nations sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian war. And after Uorld War II
the Soviet Union assailed references to domestic jurisdiction when invoked by
Spain and the Union of South Africa.
The political and practical aspects are readily apparent also in 7oviet rat-
ificetion of the UN Genocide Convention (March 1954), and the coincidert warrnng
tht the proposd draft. covenant on human rights was intended to give
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powers "a doctrinal basis for the policy of interference in the domestic matters
of other stntes."
The Soviet position thus has urd its rational ard irrational components. Among
the latter one might count Stalin's extreme fea'r of foreign 1nfiLtet t.on, his sus.
pcion of "agents." and his obsession with purges. Even in the experience of URnA.
which was an early experiment in internationtl organization cleprlr intended to
benefit the Soviet Union, Soviet insistence on going it alone was appareit. Arter
the war Professor Korovin im)lied that attempts to limit or subvert the ?lenitude
of national sovereignty were a leral expression of the inerican policy of "liber-
2
ation" for Eastern Europe.
ore rational is the argument-never a"ticulAted by Soviet s-kesmenatht a
totalitarian state demands the undivided loyalty of its citizens and can brook no
competitive foci of authority; and that it cannot afford free access to installations
(be they missile bases or forced labor camps) wiich are not normally publicized or
open to non.Soviet eyes. The Soviet insistence on sovereignty in opposing effective
Inspection and c:ntrol schemes with regard to conventional or nuclear disarmament is
of c-urse intimately relnted to this pointt Likewise relnted is Soviet refusal to
accept the argument (made by Philip C. Jessup ani others) that individuals be
recognized as subjects of international law. Once again, the effect would be to
reduce the monopoly of Soviet political controls over its citizens.
The conservatism and literalism of the Soviet position on international law have,
S1. ovtskoa -osuderstvo I 2rav2, 1955, no. 2; cited in Triska, Qn, it., p, 187.
On the evolution of Soviet doctrine, see also Jean-Yves Calvez, 2toit international
s oueralineti w M|S (Paris: Armand Colin, 1953)
2. See L. B. Schapiro,, "Soviet Participation in International Institutions." b
g.f 'dorld Affairs, 1949, p. 206. See also Bernard Demay, "L'URS* et l'Organisation
Internationale," Thesis, Doctorate in Law. Paris Universit, 1951, ch0 XVL
When in the International Law Commission of the UIH the 3ritish sibmitted a
formula to the effect that diplomats enjoy "complete freedom of movement" in
the country of their stay, the Soviet Union objected, invoking securi:ty
easons aginst its adoption. (1nte.rnaticnal .A- . (loso w)0 1917 no, 4.
ee also Johan J Hazar..' L 1 A ' A r a p, 2091 nM
-DNejlta, p.) 68
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as noted earlier, traditionally resulted in considering formal treaty provisions as
the major source of international order. It is true that after 1'orld War II a
quiet debate was wa ed in Soviet international law circles about the acceptance
of certain U4 decisions as sources of law (e.g., Krylov in 1347). V. I Lisovsky
even went so far, in a text published in 1955, as to argue that decisions of inter-
national organizations were obligatory for non-members, 'put Durdenevsky and other
stalwarts promptly protested that such a view would be tant amount to a limitation
of nati nel sovereignty.4
In this sector at least practice has customarily determined the line of theory
and practice has required "national sovereignty" to be the cornerstone of the
Soviet version of international law. In the name of sovereignty as a shield of
self-interest. the Soviet Union was unwilling, at least until 1955, to give eco-
nomic and statistical information to the United Nations. It has also striven
propa endistically to exploit the "sovereignty" theme with the Soviet Union posing
as defender of national sovereignty of all peoples? Reference to "sovereignty"
has even hA some self-defeating consequences, as exemplified in Soviet opposition
to all ECCSCC work on crime, training in public administrction, double taxation,
6
and passport regulations as ultra vires.
The fundamental reason for the tenacious Soviet insistence on "sovereignty"
has thus been a desire to maintain maxi umn freedom of' rction and keep outside
interference in Soviet af'airs to a mini'um. fois bnsical3y conservative doc.
trine springs logically from a sense of inferiority* Given the bipoLar view of
world (and 1) affairs, any abolition or restriction of sovereignty (Just as any
Charter revisions or amendment of the veto power) was bound to benefit the au
4. See Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, "Treaties and Other Sources of Order
in International Relations: The 3oviet View," iAric'n Journa 2 Internatina
4&, 1958, pp. 699--726; and Lissitsyn, o. cit. Pp. 261-62.
5. A chapter in Samarsky, 22 cit., is entitled "The Struggle of the Soviet Union
In the United ilations in Defense of the Sovereignty and Independence of Peoples,
6. See, for instance, Harold Karan Jacobson, "The Soviet Union and the Economic and
Social Activities of the United Nations," Doctoral Dissertation,, Yale University
1955, p. 406.
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bloc. Cne may speculate that a Soviet Union in command of a working majority in
the United Nations might choose to abandon the traditional rigidity and be pro-
pared to jettison "sovereignty" for the sake of greater political benefit 0
It follows that the Soviet Union, rejecting the :estern one-world romanticism
of yore., opposes the quest for world law and compulsory international courts.
Theoretically and practically, the Soviet Union can see no grounds for delegcting
or abdicating its authority to a body over whici it has no si ,nificant measure of
control for purposes of arbitration of compulsory jurisdiction. Hence the practical
Soviet view that the "prospects of the International Court of Justice contributing
to the -eaceful reeulation of international relations are extremeli, meager*" 7
In line with the change of political "line" toward UN organs, the present attitude
toward the Court is not quite so negative. Yet, while granting that the Court has
served the cause of international legality and coexistence, Justice Krylov's final
assessment (1958) was that "a number of decisions and opinions of the Court are
unseatisfactory" Its majority "pursued a discriminatory policy" toward the East
Furopean states and in a variety of cases "assumed the position of the position of
the colonialists" or "defended the interests of the imperialist powers," 7a
Indeed, says the recent Soviet Juridical Dictionary, "since the representatives of
imperialist atetes make u, the majority of the International Court, the large
capitalist countries can almost always count on a decision of the International
7bCourt correspondin: to their interests."
7. Akolai Poliansky, :eahdunarodny [ (&Moscow: Akademila nauk, 1951), p. 4oSee also 11azard, oga cit pp. 297-99; and Calvez, 2. it., pp. 255-59o
7 S,B- Krylov, ?esliduriaro~nyi mud Organizataii Obedraenm~yh Natei (PbSCOW:
3031urisdat, 1953), pp. 14s 163--.64(c
7b., iuridicheskii slovar' (Moscow 2d ed., 1956), Is 573,
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Equally consistent has been Soviet rejection of "world federalism" and other
attempts to promote world government or even regional federations outside the
Soviet Union. Moscow has opposed coalitions of anti. and non-Soviet powers as apt
to weaken the relative position of the Soviet Union8 and it has opposed federations
of Soviet with non-Soviet states as naively impossible. 9 After all, the Soviet
formula of competitive-.if peaceful---coexistence rejects all fusion of the two
systems 'and subordination of both blocs to a common higher authority.
6. "It is scarcely possible that the contemporary gravediggers of sovereignty are
so naive as to believe in earnest that peace and harmony on earth can be assured
by creating an international parliament." (Bol'shevik (Moscow), 1946, no.22, p. 51.)
9. See Eliot R. Goodman, The Soviet Union and the World State (New York: Columbia
University Press, forthcoming, 1960). This opposition has extended both to
hostile states (such as the cordon sanitaire before World War II) and to other
members of the "socialist camp"I(such as the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation
schemes of 1947-48). See also 04 E. Polents, Teoriia vsemirnogo gosudarstva kak
orudie amerikanskogo imperialisma (Moscow, 1950),
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Sovereignty--and Soviet security considerations, in the unique Soviet sense--
likewise explain Aoscow's failure to agree to a United Jations armed force or
police force system, as envisaed by Article 43 of the Chartera And, without review-
n the intricacies of the arguments relating to other proposals for creatin UN
observer corps, peace observation commissions,etc., suffice it to say that the
Soviet Unioa has consistently argued-whatever the political motives of its stand.-
that permanent United iAtions rorces must be stationed on the territory of the con.-
tributin; stntes; to do otherwise would be to violate national sovereignty. 10
When in November 1956 the General asembly, in special session, established
a U1 Emner,ency Force, the Soviet Union abstained. "considering that the General
Assembly nust get the United Kingdom, France, and Israel to ceawe fightinJ before
occupying itself with details on the future mechanics of observation..." It like-
wise abstained from endorsing the principle of a UMF, Moscow said, because under
Chapter VII of the Charter such forces must be created by the Security Councilq not
211the General Assembly. It has refused to pay its assessed share of the UNF4P
budget on the -rounds that its establishonent was "unlawful."
President Eisenhower's advococy to the Special U14 Assembly Session on the
.iddle J:ast in 1)5? of a permanent United Nations force, along the lines of rX
evoked bitter comment from Russia. The demand for such a force wis described as
an "old U.S. trick." Hoscow explained that it would be in violntion of tle Car
to 'et the Secretary-General run a police force (even thloug-rh :1r. Jamrerskjf61- ima'
prepared to do so) since what the Charter called for was an international force
under the Security Council. ,ieedless to say, the insistence on the Security
Council stemmed from the fact that its oermanent members disposed of the veto
10. See, for instance, fuller, .iop , p. W; evin, 5.3:.,.67; and
Walter Meder, "Die Stellung Jer-Tujetunion sur UN)O, JahrbuCh fir
internationales und aauslndisches 6ffentliehes echt (Rambur),19499
0 Vol'aia sovetskais enik4lopediia, !Lzgni k .2 (oscow, 19.57), p. 480ff0
12, 0. Grinyov, "Who 'Jants an International Police Force?" ntrnational Afi
1958. no. 12, pp. 63-67
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power-.that most effective of all expressions of national sovereignty within the
framework of the United Nations.
The extreme caution displayed by the Secretrry-General and the other powers
on this issue since the fall of 1958 in the face of known Soviet opposition is
itself a measure of the political power of the Soviet bloc in the United Niations.
The Veto
According to a Soviet monograh specially devoted to this question, the
"principle of great power unanimity" is the "cornerstone" of the UN edifice, 1 3
The stubborn and unflinching insistence on the veto power, as it has come to be
known, is a highly practical matter for the Soviet Uhion.A Soviet textbook on
international affairs calls it a "most important" victory to have the principle
inserted in the UN Charter: "It offers the possibility not to tolerate the adoption
by the Anglo-American bloc of decisions directed against peace and security, against
the interests and rights of peace-loving peoples." 1 4
The Soviet Union has viewed the veto as the padlock on the door of the United
Nations. It was seen originally as a device to prevent action against itself or
its allies; and it has been available to the Soviet delegate on the Security Council
as a means of frustrating any significant move differing from Soviet policy. There
has been nothing mysterious or malicious in its use. Moscow has availed itself
of the veto not so much in order to wreck the United Nations as to compensate for
the Soviet minority position. Indeed, it has explained its need precisely in
terms of the "other" powers' numerical superiority--a sort of political stilts
to enable it to be on a level with its rivals, "The veto,.," Andrei Vyshinsky
once declared, "is a means of self-defense."
There is an element of logic in the Soviet contention that the proper resolution
13- !Jikolai Ushakov, Printslp edinoglasiia velikikh dershav v Orranizatsii
Cbndinennykh Natsii (oscow: Academy of Sciences, 1956), p0 4.
14. Ivashin, op. cit., p. 428,
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of international disputes cannot be achieved by accidental arithmetic constellations.,
"Arithmetic is arithmetic. But notarithmetic can solve questions',' such as war and peace.
Vyshinsky explained 15 In a revealing speech that bears reflection in terms of future
possibilities, Vyshinsky told the ad hoc Political Committee on November 24, 1948:
The veto is a powerful political tool. There are no such simpletons
here as would let it drop. Perhaps we use it more [than others], but
that is because we are in the minority and the veto balances power. If
we were in the majority we could make such gradiloquent gestures as
offering to waive the veto on this or that,,16
Soviet practice has followed accordingly. It will be recalled that the Soviet
Union insisted initially on the inclusion of procedural questions under the scope of the
veto (and has used the so-called "double veto" to prevent issues from being considered
procedural). In fact , the veto (which the Soviet Union has been almost--but by no means
completely--alone among the Great Powers to wield) has often been applied to trivial
matters. More than half the vetoes were cast to turn down new members (later admitted
under the legally dubious "package deal"), Other vetoes canceled a condemnation of
Albania in the Corfu Channel dispute; prevented an investigation of Soviet bacteriological
warfare charges in Korea, of the Czechoslovak change of government in 1948, and of the
violation of Manchurian air space in 1950; snd stalled the election of a new Secretary-
General of the United Nations.
There is little doubt that Moscow views the veto power as a sine qua non of
participation in the organization,17 In this light, the widespread debate on the ways
of correcting either the abuse of its exercise or the extent of its applicability
seems futule at best. The veto controversy was a consequence of Great
15. Speech of October 10, 1950, cited in Emerson and Claude, op cit.,, pp. 7, 9,
16., The New York Times, November 25, 1948.
17- "He who ":ai .as ,auid agi 
- te priniple of unanimity, .. raises it against the very
exism.~e ..C 2;i Uted Adn >he 4Jabol.tion of the principle Of unanimitya 
-wouldin practice mean the liquidation of the UN" (New Times (Moscow), 1948, No, 42, p, 5),Renouncing the veto "Would mean in fact renouncing the chief task of the Org.aizatica
The crude guillotine of [majority) voting. owould be a real threat to the princip e o
sovereignty " (I D , Levin, "Problema suvereniteta v ustave 0ON," Sovetskoe gosudarst vo
1 pravo, 1947, No 1, p . 18.)
Power disagreement--not its cause--and was intended, at least by the Soviet Union,
precisely for such a contingency.
There is an ambiguity--or inherent contradiction--in the Soviet stand on Great
Power prerogatives at the same time as Moscow champions the equality of nations. The
problem can be traced back to the conflict between egalitarian and elitist strains
In Communist thinking. Moscow has often defended "equality" on the international, as
on an intra-national, level. Stalin in his interview with Eddie Gilmore in 1946 stated
that the strength of the United Nations "lies in the fact that it is based on the
principle of equality of states and not on the principle of the domination of some
over others." More recently Soviet propaganda has stressed the fact that the UN Charter
is based on "principles of sovereign equality and self-determination of peoples
At the same time, the Soviet leaders have been full of scorn for the small, the
weak, and the backward. Stalin once warned the powers not to deal with Russia "as if
it were Central Africa." At Yalta, Stettinius recorded, Stalin made fun of little
Albania; and in the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco his delegates made
clear that there was and could be in fact no equality of great and small states, and
that some problems must remain the prerogative of the senior members of the family of
19
nations. A Soviet writer in 1951 maintained that the one-state, one-vote formula
was absurd anyway; for what reason was there for the Soviet Union and India to have just
one vote each, as did the Dominican Republic? In February 1959 the Soviet envoy to
Tehran rebuked the Iranian authorities for dealing with the Soviet Union "as if it
were Luxembourg."
Russian Communists have a long experience in opposing "formal majorities ," Here
again the Soviet view of the world scene seems to correspond substantially
18. Eg.t Durdenevsky and Krylov, op. cit., p. 3.
19.8 S. V. Molodtsov, "Za predoterashchenie voiny, ma Pakt Mira!" Sovetskoe gosudarstvco
i pravo, 1951, No. 7, pp. 22-23.
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to the domestic view. "Democratic centralism" recognizes the equality of all
members but leaves prerogatives of decision-making to a small central body--in
this instance, the Permanent Aembers of the 3ecurity Council. 2 0
In fact, Moscow readily grants, sovereign states are "of course" unequal, and
one cannot expect the Soviet Union to abide by the same limitations and majority
21
decisions as does Luxembourg. Hence the veto power is here to stay--so long as
the Soviet bloc is not in clear control. The unmistakable implication is the
Soviet determination to adhere to United Nations decisions on a selective, pick-
and-choose bpsis in the absence of any effective enforcement machinery. Such an
approach is fully in harmony with the eclectic Soviet view of international law.
Organizagtion and Charter Revision
The prevalent Soviet polig has been to press for and defend a stronger Sec-
urity Council as a kind of super-power executive organ, and to limit the General
Assembly to a minimum of (largely consultative) power. This was the Soviet pos-
ition before and at San Francisco, and this it remained for the following years.
Fully consistent with the basic Soviet approach, it was also responsible in some
considerable measure for the failure of the Security Council to do the job for
which it was intended--in the view of some, the most striking failure of the United
Nations.22 It is well to bear in mind, of course, that the United Nations was
not set up to act against any of the great powers; and to that extent Soviet in-
sistence on Great Power accord was in keeping with the original assumptions. Yet
in fact the necessity of trying to cope with issues which the Security Council
could not or would not deal with (largely because of the veto) has resulted in a
dramatic shift from the Council to the General Assembly--particularly as a con.
20. See Triska, 22, cit, p. 402.
21. Ushakov, 21t., p. 60.
22. See Leland Goodrich, in International Orianization, 195P, p. 276.
sequence of the "Uniting-for-Peace" resolution 2 3
By and large, the Soviet Union has bitterly deplored this trend* So long as
it is in the minority, a shift from the Council to the Assembly tends to weaken
its ability to dbstruct the hostile majority. In November 1956 it abstained on
the Assembly's resolution approving of the UNEF because it considered the Council
the proper agent for its creation (or so it claimed).
On other occasions, however, it has been prepared to throw items into the
Asse'bly--when the Security Council would not act the way Moscow wanted (ego., because
of the French and British vetoes on the Suez issue) or when "mass" sentiment among
the smaller pow er or particular bloce represented in the Assembly (particularly, the
Afro-Asian bloc) was likely to assure passage of resolutions in accord with Soviet
desires (Spain, Suez, Lebanon). Especially in recent years, as the Soviet bloc
has. no longer found itself mechanically outvoted on practically all occasions, as
formerly, it has been more attuned to the opportunities of the General Assembly,
a new departure to which we shall have occasion to returno24 -
The Soviet bloc has stubbornly opposed all efforts to alter the United Nations
23. The number of Security Council meetings declined from 180 in 1947-48 to 72 in
1950-51, and 26 in 1952-53. (UeSo Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Review of the United Nations Charter (Washington: Government Printing Office,
24. Equally opportunictic has been the shift in Soviet position on the powers of
the Secretary-General. Here personalities have also played their parto Moscow
considered Trygve Lie basically hostile to the Soviet camp and, after UN action
in Korea began, labeled him an "accessory to the American aggressors." The
Soviet bloc opposed the extension of his term of office and throughout his
"extended term" refused to deal with him, corresponding with his office but not
with him personally. (See Lie, opo cito, ppo 20, 320-21, 369, 370, 40860) On
the other hand, Soviet consent to the election of Dag Hammerskjjld was one of thC
first tokens of the post-Stalin "thaw" at the UN. By 1956 the USSR backed the
Secretary-Generalus initiative in the Palestine question. In 1958 Khrushchev
included him among the persons invited to a summit conference over the Middle
Eastern crisis (which never met)o And in 1959 Moscow was prepared to deal with him
in an informal capacity of intermediary in conjunction withthe now Berlin crisis0
A1 for the prerogatives of the Secretary,'-4eneral, oscow is keeping an open mind.
"It is not clear whether he has made the necessary efforts to overcome the resise
tance of those who. 0 have no intention of carrying out" the General Assembly
resolutionso (International Affairs, 1958, no4 10, p. 38) The test, in other
words, is the extent to which Mr. Hammerekjjid emai L cr disAociats hircof
from the Western -position.
Charter, It has assumed, with good reason, that any change aiming at greater
"effectiveness" of a body dominated by forces hostile to it was bound to result in
changes detrimntal to its own interests. Hence the Soviet Union, true to its con-
servative strategy, has made itself the guardian of the Chartero From 1947 on, when
Australia and Argentina proposed a conference to revise the Charter, the Soviet
delegation has assumed a position of uncompromising hostility. It has reiterated
time and again that "the Charter does not need revision"; and that the advocates
of revision were agente promoting American plans to abolish the veto so as to "use
the United Nations for its own purposes o" In 1955 the Soviet Union refused to par-
ticipate in discussions on organizational reform; the Soviet bloc abstained from
voting for a general conference to revise the Charter, and it was largely in deference
to the Soviet position that the committee appointed to study the advisability of
revision decided to delay its recommendations until at least 1959025
A volume published in 1957 under the sponsorship of the Academy of Sciences of
Czechoslovakia found acclaim in Moscow2 6 It stressed the fact that the veto
power (which has been the major target of revisionist efforts) was not a voting
device but a fundamental United Nations concept. The Charter could not be tampered
withp for, just as the United Nations itself, it was a typical product of the tran-
sitional era in which capitalist and Communist states could "coexist"; as a common
denominator it was deemed "adequate for contemporary international conditions."
There wan a characteristic contradiction implicit in Soviet criticism of the
United Nations and the conservative defense of the "adequacy" of the Charter. Time
and again Moscow has replied to critics that all that is needed is to live up to
its termso
25o For the Soviet view, see International Affairs, 1956, no* 1, ppo 38-39; and 19$7,
no, 7, p. 110; and Samaraky, o. cito One of the aim of the Durdenevsky-Krylov
collection of documents, publishefTTn 1956, was to show that there existed no need
for Charter revision0
26. V. Kopal and I. Hrazek, Otaska revise Charty OSH (Prague: Cza Academy of Sciences,
1957); reviewed by V. Nesterov mn Topornin in International Affairs, 1958,
no, 1, ppo 114-15.
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It is not inconceivable, however, that before long the Soviet Union will be
prepared to accept certain, admittedly minor, organizational changes, While still
rejecting reform in toto (and any tampering with the veto in particular)0 Moscow
has since 1)57 declared itself willin- to discuss "enlarging the major United INat-
ions bodies" Jut it quickly became apparent that this meant the admission of
Communist China as a prerequisite for other changes; and then, as the next step,
willingness to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council-.
presumably boosting the representation of Afro-Asian and TSast European states9 2 7
This is likely to be the extent of Charter revision acceptable to the Soviet Union,,
A word is in order on the Soviet view of United 'tions membership The
initial formula for the United Nations0 just as that in the League (where 'oscow
opposed participation of Germany and Japan)% was a selective one. Participation
in the Second ':orld ar against the Axis powers and/or Japan was made a precondition
or admission. Originally, neutral and enemy states were thus discriminated against,
.oreover, at Dumbarton Caks it was the Soviet delegation that insisted on some
mechanism for the exoIlsion of members from the future United Nations. To i1oscow,
membership was thus from the outset a political issue.
Once again political utility helped to water down "principles" when it came
to admitting ex-enemy states now in the Soviet camp and (as of 1949-50) Communist
China, As has been remarked, the Soviet position amounted to an attempt to "have
its ceke and eat it" by invo'ing universalist arguments in favor of the admission
of its allies and raising conditions when it came to bprring nations which it con-
sidered potpentially inimical,,
The insistence on Chinese Communist representation led, of course, to the
27. International Affairs, 1957. no, 7, pp, 109-10; and Bol'shaia sovetskaia
entsiklopediia, Ezhegodnik 1957,, p. 481.
28, Armstrong, o p0 229c
protracted walk-out of 19504 The return of the Soviet delegation did not end the
probleno The logjam on admissions--complicated by a variety of vetoes-was finally
broken when in 1955 a "package" of sixteen new states was admitted to membership,
The Soviet Union had no hesitation in accepting the log-rolling device, which the
West had first rejected as immoral but finally came around to endorsing. Since
then the Soviet bloc has argued in favor of increasing universality of UN member-
8hip28a Indeed, the new composition of the Organization tends to increase the
representation of the Soviet orbit-- and of the "'fledgling states." This changeg
Moscow has comiented, has iLts "favorable effect" in that the United States finds it
"increasingly hard to maneuverotn29
The Afro Asian States
"The future historian," writes Hans Kohn, "may regard as the greatest grev-
olution" of ;he twentieth century not Lenin's overthrow of the short-lived free
regime L Russia in November, 19147s but the lezis conepicuous a, and, yet, more
far-reaching process whiich brought Europe ' four hundred year.s old dominion of the
globe to an end"3 0 In recent years the Soviet Union, though under Stalin slow to
perceive and utilize this perspective, has moved to ride the anti-Western tide for
its own pposes. Earlier Soviet attempts to strike at the "imperialist" powers
through their colonial back doora (such as in China in 1926-27) had either failed
or boomeranged,
28ao On the UN 's fourteenth anniversary, Moscow complained that "it had not yet
become a worldwaide organisation. The conterrptible game played by the United States
in the matter of restoring lawful rights in the United Nations to the great People s
Republic of China continues to be a flagrant violation of the Charterg seriously under-
mining the international authorit and the role of the United Nations"
(Izvestla, June 26, 1959)
29. N Bat'urin, "The 11th Session of the U.No General Assembly," Inter'natioral Affairs
1957, n, .,. po 98. See also 0, Nakropin, "The United Nations m.st Be an Instruu
of Peace," Ibido, 1957, no. 11, p6 1154
30,, Hane Kohn, "The United Nations and National Self-Deterrrdnation," The Review of
PoliicaOctober 19.58, p,, 5310
56a
It was not until the postwar world witnessed the emergence of the new fledg-
ling states that Moscow determined to launch a vigorous and imaginative campaign
extending moral and material aid to the budding assemblage of nations from the
Gold Coast to the Sea of Japan, rapidly growing in numbers, political entities,
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and specific weight in the international arena0 In doing so it could point to
its own experience of rapid economic develooment which could serve as a mode,.
its somewhat diluted doctrines of social progress and the vision of a more perfect
society, and the common anti-Western and anti-imperialist animus that permitted
it to cement a bloc of the down-trodden. It could also capitalize on the errors
and failures of western policy, which c.ntributed to the alienation of much of
this vast and crucial tier.
Soviet strategy toward the "coloni-l and semi-colonial" areas, as Moscow used
to call them, was set in 1955- It found expression in the far-reaching Soviet
support for the Bandung and Cairo Conferences and in the Khrushchevite formula of
a "zone of peace," which for the first time bracketed the "socialist cam-o" with
the uncommitted nations against the US-led coalition. At last Moscow seemed to
depart from the time-honored Communist dictum of "lie who is not with me, is
against me," to support--if only temporarily--any one prepared to go along with
the Soviet Union. The success of this strategy has been gratifying to Moscow;
both its broader political effedts and its consequences within the United Nations
specifically have contributed to the Soviet re-evaluation of opportunities and
prospects.
Some Soviet moves have, of course, been welcomte to uncommitted delegations.
Thus Soviet attacks on racial discrimination in South Africa and 3ritish 'est
Africa, and Soviet sup)ortfor Afro-Asian resolutions, especially -pparent since
the Suez crisis, naturally evoked favorable comment among the neutrals0  By 1956
Soviet cooperation at the United Nations and, at least equally import ont, Soviet
political and economic help outside the United Nations have been widely publicized
by Moscow. "The stand taken by the Soviet delegation," it declared with re erence
to the 10th Assembly session, "confirmed once again that in the Soviet Union the
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peoples of Asia and Africa have a -enuine friend."i 1  At the 11th Assembly sea-
si;,n the "socialist" states "strengthened their prestige in the eyes of the peoples
of Asia. Africa and the whole world and on a number of imoortant issues0 .were
able to rally the peace-loving forces in the UN.1" The Soviet commentary, stress-
ing the Communists' "united f'ront with those from the Afro-Asian countries," con-
cluded with marked satisfaction that the '-estern countries "cannot rule the UN
roost as they' used to."32
Two of the most hopeful aspects of the changing U. scene, then, in Moscow's
eyesare the increasing role played by the Afro.-Asian countries and the increas-
in- influence exercised over them by the Soviet Union. Indeed, the changing com-
position of the United nations adds to this optimisn. Lew admissions tend to
increase the numerical strength of precisely this bloc, and further changes in
this sense are anticipated for the years ahead. Loscow's optimisi about the
automatic alliance which, it trusts, will be forged betwveen the non-Communist and
the Commnunist states in the "zone of peace" ptay, it is true,, be excessive; the
Soviet Union has almost invariably tended to see the world scene in more favorable
hues than others and has failed to appreciate the extent to which Soviet actions
tend also tc antoganize the uncommitted. And the recipe of temporary cooperation
may be more transparent in terms of ultimate objective than Uoscow is prepared
to beliLeve. Yet Soviet efforts in this direction have been patently successful,
Their success has been aided by the Soviet position with regard to trusteeships
and to technical and economic aid.
Soviet attacks on colonialism are of course nothing new;Soviet criticism of
the League's mandate system had also been severe. _However,, in 1944-45 Soviet inter-
31, iamenev and Korin, oo eito, po 36.
32, o Baturin, "The llth Session of the U.I4 General Assembly," International
Affpirs, 1957, no. 1 p. 102; no,, 4,, pp, 27, 35
est in the trusteeship system was considerableo It appears to have been due,
first, to a hope of gaining a direct voice in colonial affairs, since in the Soviet
view it behooved a -reat power to be c:-nsulted on all matters (and not, as the
Charter provided, only where "directly concerned"); 3 3 and, second, to an attempt
to obtain a trust territory for the Soviet Union to administer--specifically,
Italian Tripolitania. The latter effort failed, as did a Soviet attempt to
secure joint supervision with Italy--contrary to the general Soviet hostility to
joint trusteeships.3 5
After this failure the Soviet attitude cooled. "-hen the first eight trustee-
ship agreements were completed, the Soviet delegate refused to participate in the
election of the Trusteeship Council in December 1946, claiming that the agreements
were in conflict with the Charter. The Soviet Union thus absented itself from the
Trusteeship Council until April 1948; then once again political considerations
decided it to appear when the ?alestine issue was before the Council.
The Soviet Union and its allies have since used the Trusteeship Council as a
forum for propaganda aimed particularly toward the colonial peoples themselves.
Advancing stock recommendations and recipes substantially similar for all areas
involved, M-oscow has charged that the administering powers have been guilty of
fla.-rant violations and of resorting to veiled annexption or purposive stagnation
of the territories. In a demagogic appeal for Afro-Asian support at the llth
General Assembly session it proposed independence for trust territories within
three to five years. But, whatever the schedule, Moscow was prepared to affirm
33. 11olotov advanced the view that all great powers were "directly concerned" in
all trusteeship agreements when in December 1945 the United Stetes asked to
administer the formerly Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific, For a dis-
cussion of the issues involved, see also R.14. Chowdhuri, International !Landates
pri Trusteeship Systems (The Hague:, ijhoff, 1955), ppo 7?, 87; and Joseph J.
Sisco, "Soviet Attitude toward the Trusteeship System," Doctoral Dissertation,
University of Ciicago, 1950.
34. See also James F. Byrnes, 02, git., p. 96.
35. Chowdhuri, oo. it. , pp. 57-58. Fuller (2o. cit. p. 150) has correctly remarked
that the USSR departed from its habitual strict construction of the Charter
when it was politically desirable to obtain a voice over other states' trust
territories.
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that "time is workin against the colonialists." Increasingly the voice of the
colonial peooles (as interpreted and assisted by :oscow) can be heard.3 6
Fundamentally. of course, trusteeship conditions cannot,, in the Soviet view,
provide an acceptable "solution" to the colonial question. Why, then, Soviet sup.
port for the institution? A Soviet mono-raph exp-lains with unusual candor and
cogency:
The international system of trusteeship represents an attempt to
solve the national-celonial question by means of reforms, through
a partial improvement in the conditions of the colonial peoples,
without threatening the foundations of imperialism. , This system
as it were legalizes the colonial system....
How then can one explain that the Soviet Union signed the Charter
of the UTI and consequently has recognized the trusteeship system? Is
not such an attitude toward trusteeship equivalent to a renunciation
by the USSR of the revolutionary solution of the national-colonial
question?...
So long as the trusteeship system contributes to the struggle of
the colonial peoples for freedom, the Soviet Union will cdntinue to
support it, since trusteeship not only legalizes the colonial system
but also amounts to a vehicle for attaining independenceo...The Soviet
Union does not idealize the trusteeship system, co.aridering it merely
as an insignificant concession on the part of the colonial powers,
due to the struggle of the colonies' population. It has stood and
unalterably stands for the revolutionary method of solving the
national-colonial question.37
Soecialized Aiencies
The Soviet interest in both the League and United Nations has been tradit.
ionally centered on the problems of peace and security. Correspondingly, the
Soviet Union has displayed little enthusiasm for or initiative in the various
specialized agencies under the Economic and Social Council or otherwise affiliated
with the United Nations, This priority of interest is not new. At the time of
'unich, in 193e, Litvinov curtly dismissed the other members' interest in
36. P. Rzhanoy,, "The Forthcoming Session of the Trusteeship Council," International
Agfairs, 1958, no. 6, p. 89; Chowdhuri, o2m ci.,o pp. 101 304; Baturin,, o
t no. 4, p. 30.
37. 3. 1. Shurshalov, Rezhim mezhdunarodn~o opeki (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1951),
pp. 160-61. See also Levin1 22r cit., pp, 215-19.
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decisions regarding the dru-, traffic, assistance to refugees, establish-
ment of an international system of signaling at grade crossings0 and
the results of the statistical and other searches of our various commis.
sions. But what have all these questions, important as they are in them-
selves, in common with the maintenance of peace, the main object for which
the League was set up?3 8
In the 1944-45 negotiations the Soviet delegates repeatedly attempted to keep
the social and economic tasks (which they considered expendable, anyway) entirely
separate from security concerns. Indeed, neither the philosophy of UNESCO.-
cosmopolitan, humanitarian, and broadly cross-cultural.-nor the assumptions under-
lying capitalist international economic organizations were apt to prove accept-
able to the Soviet Union. Hence Soviet participation in social and economic
agencies generally has proved little more than perfunctory 2 9
Soviet membership and activity have been eclectic. Frot the outset the Sov-
iet Union refused to join the International Civil Aviation Organization because
Soain, Portugal, Switzerland belonged to it. It repeatedly assailed the Inter.
national Refugee Crganization as an anti-Soviet tool. By 1946 the Soviet Union
had joined only 7 out of 22 international specialized agencies under the 'United
Nations. when asked why it failed to keep up membership in the World Health
Organization, Grormyko described the 4WH0 as "useless" and therefore not deserving
participation140 In 1951 Andrei Vyshinsky replied to charges by Selwyn Lloyd that
the Soviet Union ignored these bodies. "What do these organizations amount to?"
Vyshinsky inquired. The IRO, "instead of helping to return the refugees home, has
become a recruiting and supplying bureau for cheap contract labor to plantation
owners, for the recruitment of hired traitors, and for the organization of armed
groups to engage in enbversive and diversionary activity inside the USSR and
the countries of people's democracy...." And so it went for each group oscow
38. Cited in Arthur Upham ?ope, gam Litvinoff (:ew York: L. B. Fisher, 1943), p. 18.
39. This is also the conclusion of Harold K. Jacobson, "The Soviet Union and the
Econo-.ic and Social Activities of the United i4ations," p. 402 ff. See also
Raymond Dennett, and Joseph E. Johnson edso,, Negotiating wih the Russians (Boston:
World Peace Foundation, 1951), p. 106 and passim.
40. Trygve Lie, 92a 2i1-o p. 304.
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did not care for.
It is. worth noting that Vyshinaky singled out for approval some strictly
technical, non-political bodies, "The USSR takes an active part in international
organizations which are useful--e.g., the International Meteorological Organization,
the Universal Postal Union, and others .941
As the cold war grew colder, the Soviet Union and the satellites left some of
the bodies to which they had earlier belonged. In February 1949 the Soviet Union, the
Ukraine, and Byelorussia withdrew from WHO; in the following year Bulgaria, Rumania,
and Albania followed suit . In December 1949 Czechoslovakia left the Food and Agricultural
Organization; in 1950 Czechoslovakia and Poland withdrew from the International
Monetary Fund.
Until 1963 the Soviet bloc displayed no initiative in the non-political field.
Moscow likewise barred many of the specialized agencies from operating in Eastern
Burope. Soviet unwillingness to make available other than strictly selective statistics
42on its econoW and society further contributed to the Soviet withdrawal. By 1950-
1951 the Soviet Union had come to view the specialized agencies, by and large, as
enemy tools in the war.
After the nadir of 1952, however, the Soviet appraisal and conduct gradually
became more realistic. As Harold Jacobson has suggested, in the course of time the
Soviet Union became "more and more aware of the possibilities that this work afforded
43
and took an increasingly active role in it." On April226, 1954 it joined the Inter-
national labor Organization; on April 21, 1955 it adhered to UNESCO; and on January 27,
1956 it resumed membership in WHO. (It had kept up membership in the Postal, Tele-
communications, and Meteorological Unions.) Mon-
41. Vyshinsky, o. cit., pp. 90-91 (speech before the Political Committee, November 30,
1951),
42. See, e.g., Mez , Soviet Polic in the Far East 1944-1951, (New Yor1, Oxford
University Press, 1953), p. 253.
43. Jacobson, op. cit.,, pp. 403, 418-419.
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bership in UUESCO in particular-after years of labeling it an "auxiliary of the
U.S. State Department" promoting imperialism "under the flea of cosmopolitanism"--
44betokened at the very least a chan;e of- style.
It is significant, on the other hand, that Soviet adherence remained select-
ive. Soviet hostility toward the International Ionetary Fund and Bank has not
mellowed. These remain capitalist instruments which Moscow does not wish to sup-
port; their ties with the United iNations "serve merely as a cover for activities
actually conducted in the interests of monopolies" of certain 'Western countries. 4 4a
The most significent changes were reserved for the economic field. Once again
changes at the. United Nations reflected broader alterations of Soviet strategyo
The Thrushchev: era has seen the Soviet Union embark on an extensive and dynamic
45program of economio and technical assistance abroad. Earlier Soviet efforts in
this field were typified by attempts to have such aid channeled through the United
Nations. In a characteristic departure from customary ivviet determination to
limit United Nations authority, 1oscow has preferred a neutral UN label on foreign
to a US or UK label--just as in disarmament Moscow argued for United Nations (rather
than United States) custody of nuclear stockpiles so long as the Soviet Union
itself had none to contribute. United Nations control of economic aid, in other
words, was a desirable policy when Moscow was not actively offering such aid.
Lven in the present phase, however, the Soviet Union can expect to benefit
as a well-advertised "liver" through United Nations media, Now, moreover0 Mos.
cow insists as part of its "cooperation" in this field that the United 14tions
(rather than the United States) sponsor a Xast program to develop the economies
46
of underdeveloped countries.
44. See Armstrong. on cit a p. 222, and passim,
44a. Mezhdunaroduvi Qolitiko-ekonomicheskii ezhecodnik 125 (IMos ow: Gospolitizdat,
1958), p. 548.
459 See Joseph S. Berliner, oviet Egonomic Ald (New York: Praeger, 195e).
46. See, e.g., (editorial,) "On the Eve of the 11th Session of the U.N. General
Assembly," International Affairs, 1956, no. 10, p. 16. See also Alvin Z. Rubin-
*itein, "Soviet Policy in ECAFiE." International Organization 1958. no6 e
and enhance Soviet prestige and influence in the underdeveloped countries4
The shift in Soviet strategy with regard to the International Trade Organisa-
tion has been substantially similar. Originally the Soviet Union insisted on
bilateralism and displayed a marked lack of enthusiasm for supporting capitalist
free-trade schemes. It voted for none of the ECOSOC resolutions on the mechanics of
trade, including conventions on samples, advertising, and elimination of double
taxation, claiming that they violated the sovereignty of member states. Yet from
early 1953 on Moscow has displayed a more cooperative attitude, favoring an ex-
pansion of East-West trade and attacking "artificial barriers" to world commerce,
such as the United States ban on strategic exports0
The Soviet stand has been pliable in accordance with the needs of policy,
posessing a flexibility perhaps best illustrated by the Soviet efforts in the field
of labor0 Traditionally hostile to the ILO (from which it withdrew in 1940 and did
-not return, even when invited, in the war years), the Soviet Union may have hoped
to build up the World Federation of Trade Unions into a (Soviet-controlled) rival
or substitute for the ILO, Hence at San Francisco and during the following year
the Soviet Union ardently pushed the cause of the WFTU, backing its demand for a
privileged status on the Economic and Social Council and even for a seat in the
General Assembly, while opposing similar rights for the American Federation 'of
Labor and the International Cooperative Alliance0
48. Robert Loring Allen, "United Nations Technical Assistance: Soviet and East
Eur9pean Participation," International Organisation, 1957, p. 630. Contributions
pledged for 1959 include:
UNTAP SUNFE
USSR $1,000,000
Ukrainian SSR 125,000 125,000







The United States contribution amounts to $38 milliono
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After the failure of these efforts, late in 1946 the Soviet Union adopted a
less active policy in the labor field. But with the return to the ILO in 1954,
a new and typically dynamic Soviet effort began, intended to capture the world
trade union movement and to make itself the spokesman for the cause of labor
49
ev erywhle.re
The Soviet attitude toward the specialized agencies has thus vacillated from
fear and scorn to a desire to capitalize on'them for !olitical ends. In periods
of increasing strength and imagination the latter policy seems to have h'd the
upper hand, and it is likely to prevail-without entailing any bnsic change in
the Soviet view of such groups as ILD, 117, and IESCO as ancillary at best and
noxious at worst. The ones fully accepted by Moscow as constructive are the
technical, "innocent" bodies allocating radio wave lengths, exchanging technical
know-how. or pooling neteorological information.
Disarmament and 1uclear Weaoons
None of the endeavors at the United i!ations has been more arduous, more fruit-
less, and perhaps more tragic than the efforts to re'ch some agreement on effect-
ive reduction in armaments--either in conventional or in nuclear weapons.
Were one to measure Soviet intent solely by the attention paid in Soviet dom-
estic and foreign propaganda alike, the Soviet "struggle for peace" would lead
(along with the "struggle for independence and sovereignty of nations") as the
foremost cause pursued by the Soviet Union. In fact, the long record of disar.
mament talis since 1922 has shown, time and again, an uncanny Soviet ability to
49. See Harold X. Jacobson, "Labor, the UU and the Cold War," International
Orgnixation, 1957, pp. 66-67; and E. John O'Rosky, "The Attitude of the
Soviet Union during the United Nations Discussion of the Question o the
WOTJ, 1945-1946" Russian Institute Certificate Essay, Columbia University,
1953. The Soviet Union scored a success when, on June 8, 1959, the ILO after
a long fight agreed to seat Communist employer delegates on its various
committees.
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identify itself with "peace-loving" forces but to resist disarmament schemes
involving effective controls and inspection. Indeed, in the 1920's, when Moscow
expressed its views more candidly than it has of late, it was frank to say that
it could not believe in the international equivalent oC "class peace"; and that
therefore disarmament in a world dominated by powers hostile to the Soviet Union
was an invitation to suicide. It acknowledged that "the signin; of the iellogg
Pact by the Sovit-t Union must be considered above all as a oropaganda act which
v50
once more demonstrates our peaceful tendencies." Justice Kozhevnikov in 1931
attacked a volume on disarmament (by Korovin and V. V. Egorov) because
after reading it one has the impression that the USSR, in announcing
its plans of total and partial disarmament, genuinely believes in the
objective possibility of their realization to a lesser or greater
extent. The soecificity of our policv of struggle Por 'disArmament'
has not been shown....51
And the Sixth Comintern Congress stated publicly with regard to the 6itvinov
proposals at Geneva that
the aim of the Soviet proposals was not to spread pscifist illusions
but to destroy them...Disarmament and the abolition of war are
possible only with thze fall of cppitalism.... t goes without saying thnt
not a singtle Coimunist thought for a moment that the imoerialist worlI
would accept the Soviet disarmament proposals.52
Since World War 1I *oscow has again made strenuous and successful efforts
to assume the leadership of the "camp of peace." Alone with its efforts outside
the United *'Ptions, its proposals for drastic arms cuts have helped its propaganda
endeavors*
Fven in the absence of nuclear disarmament, a drastic cutbec'< in nrmed forces
and conventional weapons, Moscow has reasoned, would shift the bplance of power
5'. SWjO g IY-tk ;I m'drt*- voligtsiie1 2rM 1930,, no. 2, p. 164.
51. i.. 1931, no. 1, p. 172, cited in Laoenn, on. cit., go ?90.
52. t Sjgyi Con~ess g ta Communist Internati'Vnal (::oscow, 19''), go 3
See also Triska, oR. CIL** p. 301.
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in favor of the Soviet Union because of the natural advanta e it would possess
with regard to manpower (and also propaganda machinery and perhaps Communist
Parties throug:hout the world). Giv.en "peaceful coexistence" as a non-military
contest,* Uoseow was bound to seek ways -nd means for the relative weakenin. of
the "other" side. And once the "other" side made objections, the Soviet propaganda
muachine was quick. to exploit 'estern "procrastinations" and'sabota7e" for its ends.
The details o' the negotiations need not be ra.examined here.5 3  rom the
outset, the Soviet Union has rejected the initially -enerous American proposals
for international control .nd ownership such as the lar2ch ?lan. Beginning with the
insistence that atomic energ problems be subject to Security Council veto and
ending; with a Soviet veto o' the three UN ARC reports in June 1947, the Soviet
dele;;ation protested all attempted "infrinements of national sovereignty" and
intelligence operations in the guise of nuclear 'weapons controls; it countered
with a proposal amounting to (1) a declarative prohibition on the p3roduction
and use of atomic weapons, and (2) subsequent negotiations about international
controls. It was willing to support international inspection to the extent that
it was compatible with the "sovereign rights of states."
Thus, while the Soviet Union had no atomic weapons until 1949, it was inter.
ested in avoidin: foreign interference in its own activities; in embarassing the
United Ststes; and in attempting to induce the United States to turn over its
stockpiles to international control or to destroy theme Since it was the weaker
party, it stood to gain from dragging out negotiations in the hope of speaking
before long from a position of greater strength. In the meanwhile 'it insisted
on the application of the veto in international controls (particularlr with
3 The record of the ' Atomic Ener;;y Commission is analyzed in a *uperior
dissertation by Joseph L. Nogee, "Soviet 'olicy townrd International Control
of Atomic Enevm, 145-.113,0 Doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 195PO
See also U. S. Senate, Subcommittee on Diseirmament, _Co!g d Reduction
2t ArmaMnt: Eina RRrl. ('Aashington, D. C.: 4overnment Printing Cffice, 1958),
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regard to sanctions against violators of international agreements) and on the
declarntive orohibition of nuclear weapons )rior to Inspection or iclostre
precisely the opposite of the estern -,osition0
So long as there was a non-Communist majority In the United Nations, the
Soviet Union deemed internationalization more harmful than the status quo,
After the interlude of 1949-54, during which the atomic energr negotiations were
deadlocked, I1oscow from 'ay 1955 on made new proposals consonant with the hroaoer
aspects of Khrushchevite foreign policy and also more fully aware of the impli.
cntions of nuclear warfare than had been apparent (and permissible) so long as
Stalinist military doctrine reigned supremeo
Yet the Soviet position, more flexible and rradually closer to that of the
Western )owers, has not roved to be significantly more tractable on key issues
such as effective inspection. Indeed, when it failed to secure the "parity." of
representation it insisted on (as discussed below)9 the Soviet Union in ovembr
195' declared a bovcott of the United lintions Disarmament- Conmission.--predtmely
t a time when the tone and content of Soviet proposals had made some 'este rn
observers believe that nuclear weapon bans or controls had moved into the field
of "negotivble" issuesl
3ow to explai n this paradox?
The most likely answer is that Soviet polevr- akers hpd indeed cone to
attribute :;reater importance to nuclear weapons and to the necessity of exploring
test bans and weapons prohibitions more thoroughly. It was nreciselv for this
reason-and because of the increas ng insistence on equal representation rather
than the routine of bein "outvoted" in "nited tions organs--t cat Moscow shifted
t R emof+ United Nations to direct talks with the ited 3tates and
the United Kin;dor. lere is one reason why it has preferrel "summit" meetings
and special conferences in Geneva to the Inited "Utions procedure
This manuscript was completed before it became known that the Soviet Union and
the Western powers had apparently agreed to create a new ten-natip commission
on disarmament, with parity of representation for the Soviet" blo, and in effect
outside of the United Nations framework, (See The New York Times, August 11 1959
?OW
-Jhile continuing to attack the United States for its failure to agree to
far-reaching and well-publicised Soviet proposals of drastic arms reductions.
declarative prohibitions, and peace resolutions--anad thus exploitinr the Jnited
Nations fror propa nda purposes, the Soviet Union appears to be committed to
ma'in real nrogress (if any) towar3 agreement in this field throu h direC deal-
in s, Disarmament talks Gromrko tndlceted1 some vears ago, had br come "a poll
tical matter." Whether or not the Soviet Union want s or ?ears agreement; whether
or not it will in the interest -- survival, eventually overcome its deeply-ingrained
fear of foreign inspection; whether or not it agrees to controls before prohibitions,
as the 'est insists.-it is unlikely that the United Nations will be the arena of
agreement. There propaganda efforts have taken the unper hani. As one andayst
has vell summed it upq the Soviet delegation has rejected WeStern proposals but
avoided the appearance of doing so; It has often evaded answers rather than caus-
in- a total breakdown of ne-otiations; it has sought to link its policies with
popular aspirations for "peace and security"; it has portrayed -the United States
as a-ressive; it has striven to keep the United States and United Kingdom from
usin, their atomic weapons for political advantage; and it has stolled for time
to advance its own standing; in the "nuclear club."4
In a Peculiar way, the Soviet position has thus been consistent in this
field too. So long as it was weak0 it sought to maintain maximum freedom of*
action in the nuclear field. And more recently, when it assumes that it has at
least matched the -est, it has sought to utilize this freedom of action as a
weapon in dealing with the 1est. Throughout this period it has rejected foreign
controls. In harmony with its position on sovereignty, which has a hard core of
practical self-intforest. It is likelv not to tie its hands so long as it can,
adhering to the admonition recently reiterated in Moscow that
5~ Nogee, 02a.0 s.. t 426.
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the Soviet armed forces must cons 4antly innrove their military
readiness so that at any momient they can not only repel an
agressor's surnrise attack against our country but con imvwed-
intelv deal him a retaliatory blow of the kind that will once
and for all put an end to any and all attempts to dis.urb by
armed force the ordained movement of the Soviet people to
communism. 55
On the other hand, the last word on Soviet willinpess to concluide bons on
weapons tests (or. for thpt matter, on surprise attacks and nrohibitions of certain
ty:es or wesons) has not yet been spoken. Just as in Nashington and other capitals,
there are likelv to be dif rerent views in Moscow with re'a-d to the imoerative or
feasibility of agreement in this field. In the balance sheet of argumvents, eco-
nomic and financial considerations along with o greater awareness of what nuclear
warfare would, mean, weiih against the traditional nnd (in their terms) well-founded
Soviet fear of independent foreign inspection on Soviet soil, The continued argu-
ments over inspection of nuclear weapon tests and the Soviet veto of the American
Arctic inspection proposal--and some revealing statements by the Soviet leadership--
suggest that the negative still prevails over the willingness to accept watertight
inspection.
While this crucial issue remains open, it may be safe to say that for the
United Nations it is likely to continue largely as a subject of charges and counter-
charges. It would be easy to dismiss it were it not so vital a matter. The
record to date invites little ootimism, for it is likelv that disarmament--just
as the United 1tions itself--can be the object of effective agreement only when
it is not needed to preserve world oeace.
55, General of the Army V. Kurasov, writing in Kragsia 2yaida, April 27, 1958;
cited in lerbert S. Dinerstein0 :U A Inj C "19b (1ew York:
Praeger, 1959), p. 211.
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V
THE DOMESTIC IMAGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
To speak of "public opinion" in the Soviet Union is to refer either
to the private and habitually unuttered views of Soviet citizens, or
else to the official "line" issued and reiterated from above. We
have no meaningful measure of "public" opinion in the sense in which
sociologists commonly speak of it in open societies. What we do know
suggests that, however substantial the grievances and doubts of the
Soviet citizenry, the rank and file is prepared--especially in the field
of foreign relations--to leave policy decisions to the government.
The impressions of recent travelers permit the hypothesis
that the United Nations occupy at best a very minor place in the
thinking of Soviet men and women not involved in the conduct or analysis
of foreign affairs.
Nevertheless, one may seek to examine the image of the United
Nations which the Soviet authorities strive to convey in their domestic
propaganda as at least one of several imperfect indices to their
own thinking about the United Nations.
Soviet publications generally have given little attention to
international organizations other than those controlled by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic% The Soviet press covers extensively and
dramatizes the speeches of Soviet delegates at the United Nations,
but the general tenor of press comment does not suggest that the
*
United Nations is of great import.
* It remains to be investigated how selective or complete Soviet coverage
of UN sessions has been even where repor.ts (and sometimes verbatim reports)
have appeared in the Soviet press.
One content analysis of the Soviet press for 1945-1951 notes that
Moscow "has little interest in publicizing the United Nations thoroughly
and throughout the year to the public at large. It does seek to keep
the Soviet public abreast of major developments during the General
Assembly sessions and in the event of important Security Council
decisions. However, the government seems singularly uninterested in
presenting systematic reports on current issues in the United Nations.
Soviet citizens must have been somewhat confused and certainly
imperfectly informed about the nature of United Nations activities
at least until 1955. Even now the Moscow press and radio produce
a composite picture which, taken at face value, depicts the Soviet
Union as the valiant champion of all good causes against the forces
of evil represented by the "ruling circles"--monopolists, militarists,
imperialists--of the major Western powers. Developments at the United
Nations--and outside of it--constituting Soviet setbacks, or debates
revealing seamier aspects of Soviet and satollite life, have been
passed over in silence or, more often, have been dismissed with a
few vitriolic adjectives and barbs intelligible only to the initiated.
After Stalin's death, it is true, the situation--in this as in many
other fields--did change perceptibly. During the preceding eight
years almost no monographic work, text books, manuals, or mass
1. Laufer, op. cit., pp. 93-94.
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consumption pamphlets on the United Nations appeared in the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic.2 (Even Journal articles were generally
limited to polemics or brief factual summaries of proceedings.) After
Stalin s death some collections of documents on the United Nations
appeared with introductory comments by the compilers (notably, the
compendium by Durdenevsky and Krylov). As already noted, a United
Nations Association was established; so was a Soviet Association on
International law, in April 1957. For wider dissemination, a few
pamphlets appeared.3 Finally, a separate volume on the role of the
Soviet Union in the United Nations appeared in 20,000 copies in 1957.
Unfortunately the book is neither particularly original nor helpful
in gaining other than strictly official, formal inZormation.
Since 1956-1957 textbooks on international law as well as
Soviet surveys of international affairs and encyclopedia yearboo'ts (themselves
innovations) have customarily included a section on "international organizations,"
2, In addition to a few United Nations documents, S.B. Krylov edited a volume
of Materials for the History of the United Nations (Moscow: Academy of
Sciences, 1949); only the first volume appeared. Other exceptions were two
studies of the Trusteeship system (Boris Shtein and B.14,Shurshalov) and
the International Court of Justice (Nikolai Poliansky and Krylov). Some
technical works have appeared on questions such as international regula-
tion of radio broadcasting.
3. In 1955, G.P. Zadoroshnyi, Organisatsiia Ob'edinennyh Natsii i
shdunariabeopasnost' (Moscow, 1955); in 1956 the pamphlets by
Samarsky and Ushakov cited earlier; in 1957, A.P. Movchan, 00N i mirnoe
sosushchestvovanie toscows 195T), and a brief account by a Ukrainian
delegate to the General Assembl, Vera Bilai, Na XI sesii Gen, Asasblei
... notatki delegata (Kiev, 1957; and in 1958, 0.P, zadoroshnyI, CO i
mirnoe sosushchestvovanie gosudarstv (Moscow, 1958). Most of these were
originally delivered as public lectures.
4. Anatolii Protopopov, Sovetskii soius v Organisatsii Ob'edinenrgkh Natsii
(Moscow: Gospolitisdat, 1957).
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with the United Nations prominently covered. While limited to fairly
non-committal substantive coverage from the Soviet point of view,
these surveys do nonetheless make information on developments at the
United Nations systematically available to the Soviet reader.5 At
the same time, the State Publishing House of Political Literature has
complained that no research or books on the United Nations were
scheduled. This was part of a broad attack being waged on behalf
of stepped-up work in the whole field o; international relations.6
While the situation has thus improved, there are severe limitations
still present. Though formally disseminated through Mezhdunarodnaia
Kniga, the official Soviet agency purchasing and selling boocs abroad,
United Nations publications and documents are not normally available
6a
to Soviet citizens. Even where the United Nations is referred to in
the schools, it is of ten a perfunctory mention. If one turns to the syllabus
of Soviet foreign policy and international relations makes no mention of the
5. E,9g, Boltshaia sovetskaia entaiklopediia, Eshegodnik 1957, and Mesadunarod
plitiko-ekonomichekii ezhegodnik, 1958.
6. International Affairs, 1957, noo 1, p. 160.
6a. During a visit to the Soviet Union in July 1959, the author attempted to
determine whether the re was in Moscow a United Nations Information Center
(as he had been told there was). If such an agency indeed exists, it is so
well concealed as to be useless as a center for the dissemination of data
about the United Nations. Repeated inquiries with Intourist guides and
representatives of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries brought out. either blank stares, or comments that they had never
heard of such a center, or else pr se inquir fT-urther--..hidh never
yielded additional information0 None of the several Moscow city directories
(1958 and 1959 imprints) list a UN Information Center in the Soviet capital.
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United Nations as a distinct topic or problem Likewise, the model outline
of the lecture on Soviet foreign policy and world affairs for 1945-1953
makes no mention of the United Nations, Even the major Soviet libraries
have highly selective holdings on the United Nations.7a
7a, The catalog of the Lenin Library in Moscow (the largest in the Soviet
Union) lists (as of July 1959) under the subject heading, United Nations,
most of the Soviet items cited above, as well as selected United Nations
publications. Among American books on the United Nations, some complia-
tions and descriptive accounts (such as Asher et al., and Goodrich and
Simons) are available. Those not available incude among others, the
books by Bloomfield, Claude, and Morgenthau0
7o CPSU, Central Committee, Section of Propagand and Agitation, Uchebnye
plany ± programmy na 956-197 god (Moscow, 1956). More recent issues
are not available.
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Indicative of official thinking, one may assume, are also the
publications of the Institute of International Relations, which amounts
to a foreign service institute. A recent such publication, referring
to the handling of the Hungarian issue at the United Nations describes
the Special UN report on Hungary as slanderous, tendentious, and
fictitious. In substance, the diplomatic counterrevolution against
Hungary at the United Nations failed just as the military pressures
and the revolt inside the country had failed, Moscow avers; and raising
the "Hungarian question" did harm only to the United Nations itself
and revealed the face of those who raised it. Moscow points to the
failure of the United Nations to pursue the issue further at the 12th
General Assembly session--a failure due to "the peaceful initiative
of the Soviet Union and the accomplishments o. Soviet science and
technology (the first sputnik had meanwhile gone up] as well as the
stabiliation, of conditions in Hiungary as a result of the energetic
48
ef.Zforts of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government,
1958 also saw the publication of the first Soviet textboo.: on
foreign policy. In line with the current assertion that the Soviet
Union was In the forefront of the sponsors of the world organization,
it asserts that "in fighting for peace along all lines, the USSR attributed
great importance to the United Nations"; and it points to Soviet dis-
armament proposals and related moves as accomplishments--largely in
8. Voprosy vneshnei politiki stran sotsialisticheskogo lageria (Moscow:
Institut mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenti, 1958), pp. 78-80.
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the propaganda sphere.i "It is not hard to imagine what tremendous
significance for the strengthening of peace the acceptance of these
constructive proposals of the USSR would have which were met with
warm approval by broad circles of the public in all countries of the
globe ." United States and British reactionary circles have sought
to make the United Nations an obedient tool "in the struggle against
the USSR and all democratic forces, for world hegemony. 9 Such state-
ments convey the flavor of current Soviet writing on the subject,
g a'lso is th c ast beteon Soviet domestic and
fcoeign propaganda. While in appeals to foreign "targets" Moscow
acimowlegathe work of UNICEF, stressing particularly how much the
Soviet government has done along similar lines in Soviet Central Asia
in recent decades,10 it is obviously not interested in giving ,ex-
tensive coverage to positive UN activities for the average Soviet
audience. "A film which D)anny Kaye did on his travels for the United
NaOtions International Children!b Emergency Fund was shown on Moscow TV--
but a month and a half later than in 25 other member countries of UNICEF,
and in far shorter form. The 90-minute film of Kaye's travels to
hospitals, camps, and other institutions to entertain underpriviledged
ll
ch.ildren was cut to precsly o1ovon iinutes 0
9. Ivan Ivashin, Ocherki istorii vneshnei politiki SSR (Moscow: Gospolitizdat,
1958), pe 425, l 82, 148.
12 'tSraviot Red Cross Head on Children s Needs", New Times, 1959, no.
16, pp. 20-21.
114 Irving R. Levine, Painstreet USSR (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959),
p. 157. For a discussion of the difference between domestic and foreign
propaganda, see also Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 231-232.
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Very few UN activities'have taken place in the Soviet Union itself.
It is probably still true that the United Nations plays a very sub-
ordinate part in the Soviet citizen's thinking about the world scene.
Soviet policy-makers have no doubt considered the possible
effect of United Nations activities on their citizens. There is not
only a noticeable difference in tone between their portrayal of the
United Nations abroad and at home but also between the fairly factual,
extensive, and technical discussion among the "professionals" in world
affairs and the virtual silence in media representing those who hold
the real levers of power,as illustrated by the Higher School of the
Central Committee and the key monthly organ of the Communist Party,
Komimnist.
No doubt, with the multiplication of contacts with the outside
world, and with the striking interest of Soviet citizens in non-Soviet
developments and opinions, the United Nations too may come into sharper
focus. Yet even a mildly optimistic appraisal must discard as too
rosy the forecast that with respect to the Soviet Union international
activities, and UNESOD in particular, "may act as a yeast whose ferment
will overflow the limits supposed to contain its expanbion." 1 2
12. Walter Iaves and Charles A. Thomson, UNESCO (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1957), p. 336.
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VI
SOVIET PERSONNEL AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Soviet Personnel
The selection, training, and competence of Soviet citizens
assigned to the United Nations remain to be studied on the spot.
What follows are merely a few impressions garnered from inconclusive
data.
The Soviet Union in 1945 found itself with a shortage of personnel
trained in world affairs. It wished to perform well in international
dealings but was unwilling to denude the Foreign Office and the foreign
service of qualified personnel. As a result, the Soviet staff at
the United Nations in the first years included men not obviously competent
for their specific positions and some who were serving part of their
diplomatic apprenticeship at the United Nations.
While much of the early 'nyet" era of walkouts and vituperation
was calculated, something in the style of Soviet performance suggested
a lack of familiarity not only with the give-and-take of parliamentary
procedure but also with the general atmosphere of diplomatic intercourse,
If it is generally true that in the present age of "instant diplomacy",
as Dana Adams Schmidt has called it, the envoy becomes a glorified
messenger, the Soviet diplomat in particular has been deprived of
freedom of action to a remarkable degree. Until recently, moreover,
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Soviet delegates and their families, and even Soviet secretarial
personnel, were harder to meet in rela.ed and informal surroundings
than virtually anyone else at the United Nations.
Yet here, too, the passage of time--and the passage of Stalin--
have wrought some changes. More personnel have been trained and are
now available for UN duties. More flexibility and, within narrow
limits, some observers feel, greater initiative are now allowed
Soviet representatives without prior reference to Moscow. More under-
standing of how the West operates may be responsible for some decline
in clich4s about Western conspiracies against the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic. One may speak of the gradual development of a
Soviet "UN type," represented at the higher echelons by Arkady Sobolev--
a man who according to associates "knows the ropes," gets around,
and has gained the respect of others.
Characteristic in his career has been the dual exposure to
Secretariat and Soviet delegation. Indeed, the dividing line between
the two is not so sharply drawn by the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
public as by other nations, per.sonnel being transferred from one to
the other. At least some Soviet citizens serving as UN officials
keep closer contact with the Soviet delegation than would appear
prnper. On some occasion, Trygve Lie relates, a high Soviet member
of his secretariat (Konstantin Zinchenko) would openly tip off Lie
that an important Soviet note was about to come.
1. Trygve Lie, op. cit.. p. 341, Thus on July 26, 1950,Zinchenko
made clear that hlik would return by August 1.
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Until about 1955 the Soviet Union failed to fill all the positions
that were available to its citizens under the rules gove1i3 geo-
graphic apportionment of Secretariat jobs. There are more than one
thousand employees at the UN headquarters in Grade 8 or above. Of
these, in 1951, 14 were Soviet citizens; in 1955, there were 19 in
2the secretariat-with a quota of 131-175 Soviet nationals. In recent years
Moscow has made a serious effort to fill vacancies, and has most recently
begun to complain of discrimination against Soviet candidates,
There has been only one case of proven espionage among Secretariat
personnel--that of Valentin Gubichev, who was deported, not for spying
but for receiving documents for transmission There are perhaps
others who have not been uncovered. Yet there is reason to assume that
the humber of "agents" Moscow maintains at the United Nations for espionage
purposes is not likely to be great, One may guess that Moscow knows too
well the risks of the game, and if need be, it has perhaps less conspicu
ous individuals at its disposal in the United Nations,
The Soviet Foreign Office, which now has seven Western and four
Eastern geographic divisions, also has a department for international
organization and another on international economic organization.
As of 1959, the section dealing with international organizations Is
2. Emerson and Claude, op. cit., p. 23; U.S. Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 352; Soviet Delegation Press
Release, June 25, 1959, reported in The New York Times June 26, 1959.
. W
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in the hands of Semion K. Tsarapkin, who has considerable first-
hand experience with North American diplomacy. It is through this
department that Moscow maintains contact with its delegation at the
United Nations.
Little need be said about Soviet negotiatory behavior, other
3
comments having substantially covered the field, but it may be use-
ful here to note a few facets of Soviet conduct . Striking among
these are the refusal to "play" when miffed, outraged, or uninstructed,
The long list of "walk-outs", from the Iranian case in early 1946 to
the most recent boycotts of the sub-committee on disarmament and
the refusal to take a seat on the Committee on Outer Space, is not,
however, a monument to impulsiveness. Soviet walk-outs and boycotts
have been calculated tactics terminated whenever practica. reasons
of sufficient magnitude have appeared. Thus the Soviet absence from
the Security Council in 1950 was ended when Moscow decided to inter-
fere with the UN war effort in Korea; Soviet refusal to take a
seat on the Trusteeship Council was waived when in 1948 the Palestine
issue came up on its agenda.
In addition to the dexterity in the uninhibited use of the absence-
and-presence game, the Soviet delegation has made a mark for itself
3. See Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., op. cit., particu-
larly, pp. 231-235, 272-276, and 290-296; and John Campbell, Negotia-
ting with the Soviets," Foreign Affairs, January 1956.
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by its virtuosity in the use of legal and verbal technicalities to
defend its point of view, often against heavy odds of logic and
fact. It has tried to wear down the opposition by reiteration. It
has been quick to level counter-charges whenever accused of wrong-
doing. When Iran complained of Soviet interference in itsinternal
affairs, Vyshinsky filed charges against British interference in
Greece, and Dmitri Manuilsky (for the Ukrainian delegation) accused
the British of intervention in.Indonesia: 'for one charge, two counter-
charges' seemed to be thestmple Soviet prescription. It has remained
substantially the same down to the Soviet response to the Hungarian
case of 1956-1957. Finally, 'Russia has seen fit to ignore the United
Nations whenever such a course was convenient. In substance, the
range of Soviet behavior has thus amounted to an adaptation, or a
selective projection,.of earlier Bolshevik experience at home.
It may be well to add, however, that Soviet tactics have not
always been a success. Several observers of the United Nations
scene have pointed out that, especially in the Stalin era, the Soviet
Union antagonized the small powers by treating them cavalierly as
appendages of the "imperialists" or as "obedient lackeys" of the
United States. There was good reason to wonder why the Soviet
delegation wrote them off, as it were, in advance. More than that,
in a very real sense, "the Soviet Union [was] itself responsible for
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the consistently large majorities which the United States [was] able
to muster on political questions."
Those days are past. Part of the new era in Soviet diplomacy
has been a greater consciousness of "public relations," a greater
ability to differentiate among nuances of hostility, and a greater
dexterity in dealing with non-Communist forces.
The Soviet Bloc
Even though pressing for continued Great-Power hegemony, Moscow
foresaw the future scramble for votes among international entities
as early as 1943. On December 19, 1943,it asked that in the future
world organization all sixteen constituent Republics of the Soviet
Union be given separate representation. This was indeed one of the
reasons behind the constitutional amendments adopted on February 1,
1944, granting the Union Rlepublics the right to enter into direct
diplomatic and treaty relationo with foreign states. At Dumbarton
4. Robert E, Riggs, Politics in the United Nations (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1958), p,, 40. See also Sterling Hale Fuller, "The
Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in the League and United Nations,"
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas, 1952, p. 391.
Occasionally Soviet behavior had its humorous overtones, as
when the Soviet delgation replied to the Secretary General regarding
forced labor in the following terms:
The Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to
the United Nations presents its compliments to tle United
Nations SeCretariat and herewith returns, unexamined, the docu-
ments attached to the Secretariat's letter of November 22,
1952, since these documents contain slanderous febrications
concerning the Soviet Union.
(Cited in Robert Asher et al.., The United Nations and Promotion of
the General Welfare [Washington, D.C,: Brookings Institution, 1957],
p. 773n.)
5! See Sherwood, Roosevelt and H opkns, pp. 875-877.
U5
Oaks the Soviet delegation accordingly asked for sixteen seats in
the United Nations--a request which promptly ran into Western opposition.
At Yalta Stalin offered to whittle down this demand to three votes
(adding separate delegations for the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSR's
to the Soviet Union's own) as part of a larger settlement; and Pre-
sident Roosevelt, who had left Washington determined to prevent this,
found himself accepting this proposition (as did British Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden) in return for a Soviet promise to support
the grant of three votes to the United States. Within less than
two months the three-vote deal "leaked" out in the American press,
producing "one of the worst all-around botches of the war" and necessari-
) 5ly leading to a US statement renouncing its extra two votes. The
Soviet Union, however, stood firm on its demand and obtained the
three seats at San Francisco.
Moscow has never explained the rather illogical situation by
which two of the Union Republics are in the United Nations while
the remaining ones--legally on equal footing--are not,- It has made
some use of the quasi-independent status of these republics to have
them conclude treaties and agreements (e.g., with UNRRA in 1945;
peace treaties in 1947; the Warsaw Pact in 1955). The Ukrainian SSR
held one of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council in 1948-
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1949 and has served on various other UN bodies, as has the Byelo-
russian Republic. The situation has remained anomalous, for these
Republics have repeatedly refused to establish direct diplcmatic
relations with , for example, the United Kingdom. On the other
hand, the General Assembly session in the fall of 1950 was attended
by the "foreign ministers" of the Uzbek and Kazakh SSR's, which are
6
not separately represented at the United Nations.
With the passage of time the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delega-
tions (elevated to permanent missions at the United Nations in April
1958) have come to be accepted as appendages to the Soviet representa-
tion. They have not acted independently; they have been useful as
additional votes and speakers, and sometimes as "frontmen" when the
7
Soviet ventriloquists have preferred to remain silent.
6. There is probably some reality to the resentment voiced by the
Chairmren of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek Republic, Manzur
Mirza-Akhmedov, to the group headed by Adlai Stevenson in the Summer
of 1958. Robert C. Tucker reported that Akhmedov gave the impression
the Uzbek Republic had expected UN membership. "He spoke, for example,
of the disappointed Uzbek hopes at the time of the founding of the
United Nations... .The general tenor of his remarks was such as to
suggest that the continued non-membership of sovereign indepondent
Uzbekistan in the UN is one of the regrettable and serious anomalies
of the world situation and ought to be remedied at the world's first
opportunity." (Robert C. Tuciaer, Impressions of Russia in 1958,
Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1958, P-1570, p. 33.)
7. For students of international law and especially Ukrainian and
Byelorussian nationalists, the representation does raise interesting
opportunity for speculation. See RawIn Yakemtchouk, L'Ukraine en drott
international (Louvain: Centre Ukrainian d'1tudes en Belgique, 1954);
and Vsevolod Holub, Ukraina v Ob'ednanyhh Natsiiakh (Mtnich: Suchasna
Ukraina, 1953).
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More difficult and in many respects far more important to the
Soviet Union has been the cementing of a "bloc" with the other countries
of the "socialist camp." It has been eminently successful in this
endeavor. The three Soviet votes, originally augmented by the Polish
and Yugoslav votes, constituted a solid bloc--counting, after 1948,
on Czechoslovakia but losing Yugoslav support after the Stalin-Tito
break. With the admission of 16 additional states in December 19W,
the Soviet contingent rose to nine, thanks to the addition of Albania,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.
As Mr. Thomas Hovet has demonstrated in an excellent study,
the Soviet bloc operates with more cohesion and unanimity than any
other combination of states in the United Nations. The Soviet and
satellite delegations have regular joint meetings; their decisions
8
are binding; and their voting is virtually unanimous. Whatever the
strains among the Communist delegations (and their home states),
Soviet control over them (and their home states) has proved effective
to this date. As a matter of principle, prestige, and--in this case--
above all, practical import, Moscow will undoubtedly continue to
insist on the "unanimity of the socialist camp.
8. -See Thomas Hovet, Jr. "Bloc Politics in the UN," unpublished J6
Center for International Studies, MIT, pp. 58-64. I-f arr occasion., because
of alphabetical voting order, a satellite proves to have voted differently
from the USSR, it usually requests amendment of its vote after the
Soviet vote has been cast.
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VII
THE SOVIET OUTWOK: TODAY AND TO?|DRROW
The United Nations was established at a time when no world
order existed;'none was imposed by the victors whose coalition first
assumed that name, and none could later be agreed upon among them.
A major share of the blame for this has commonly been assigned to
the Soviet Union and not without reason. The Soviet view, however,
has not been the product of perversity or malice. It has followed
with iron logic from the world view of the Communist leadership,
Whichrefuses to see in the United Nations (any more than in the
League of Nations) the budding parliament of man or tho instrument
of human brotherhood, but instead sees it as essentially another
arena for the struggle between the two dialectic opposites of our
age.
The Soviet view feeds on a complex admixture of ideological
commitments and realistic appraisals. It amounts to an elusive
balance concealed behind walls of words and slogans, clich6s and
rituals. It has been marked by striking tenacity and continuity;
and when genuine evolutions of view have taken place, they have not
usually been so announced. Yet continued attachment to the same.
basic beliefs and expectations has permitted --nay, invited--a wide
variety of means in the pursuit of their attainment.
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In the United Nations the Soviet position and outlook have faced
conceptual problems that go back to the essence of Communist strategy.,
One has been the place of a "revolutionary" power such as the Soviet
Union in an assembly committed, if not to the status quo, at least
to "reformist", peaceful change. Another has been the conflict between
claims of Communist superiority and the Soviet commitment to operating
in the United Nations as one of a number of equal states. A third
has been the necessity of working among colleagues whom the doctrine
describes as eventually moribund. The Soviet Union has heaped scorn
and ridicule on the United Nations--and steadfastly sought recognition
for its friends, allies, and dependents within it.
The Soviet Union has participated in the United Nations for limited
purposes and perhaps for a limited time. In its view, membership
is a contract based on the mutuality of certain interests. The key
to Soviet strategy within the organization is to be found in the
assessment of Soviet strength and weakness, both in and out of the
United Nations. In brief, four distinct variants can offer themselves
to its policy-makers:
1) Non-participation. This policy commended itself until
1934 and was rejected for the United Nations.
2) An- isolationist strategy, restrictive in its interpretation
of United Nations rights. This policy has prevailed when the Soviet
bloc has been in a consistent minority position, for it tends to
minimize outside infringements, stresses Soviet prerogatives of sovereignty,
and denies UN jurisdiction; it has been the typical position since
1945.
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3) A broad, expansive strategy in which the Soviet Union
seeks to maximize UN power. This is the typical Soviet policy for
a Communist "front" organization; no doubt Moscow hopes that some
day the Soviet bloc may control the United Nations adequately for
such a course, but clearly the day is not at hand.
4) A strategy of helpful cooperation, practised when the Soviet
Union needs the United Nations against a third power much as the
Soviet Union sought to buttress its own position vis-A-vis Germany
and Japan in 1924-1939, While no one will admit this, China may
at least theoretically be such a problem at some future date.-
Until 1955-1956 there could be little doubt that Moscow (and the
rest of the world) saw the Soviet bloc as a permanently weak minority
within the organization. It followed that the United Nations, being
overwhelmingly hostile to the Soviet Union, must be kept weak, Soviet
membership and the United Nations itself were held to be almost
expendable; at times participation was deemed useful (1945, 1948),
at others detrimental (1950). In theory and practice the United Nations
often went counter to Soviet views and 1nterests, but to Soviet policy-
makers the advantages of belonging clearly outweighed the advantages
of leaving,
Since then, in the Xhrushc1h era, Moscow has tended to look
upon the United Nations as a real weapon B oth in and out of the
United Nations the world situation has been generally favorable to
the Sovi;et bloc, and Moscow has perceived the new trend with marked
elation and more than habitual optimism. For the first time- there
is serious oxpectation of having the Soviet-led "socialist camp" lead
91
the majority of mankind, Since late 1957 Moscowi has reiterated witb
increasing intensity and perhaps conviction the view that the Soviet
orbit is rapidly gaining pre-eminonce and is ever growing in strength,
The projection of this trend extends to the expectation of Soviet ascenden
in the United Nations too. The events of recent years have confirmed
Moscow in the reality of Soviet emancipation from its protracted status
of an embattled, consistently outvoted minority--a status to which
it seemed doomed as recently as four years ago. This trend has been
encouraged, in the Soviet view, both by the changing attitude of some
states toward West and East and by the changing composition of the
United Nations The trend in the increase of UN membership favors
the non-Western nations, thus giving the combination of Soviet-
oriented and uncommitted states a distinct edge.- this is precisely
the range of nations which current Soviet efforts seek to bracket
as the 'zone of peace' and to iuxtapose to the "imperialist" powers..
An important place in increasing the role of the United
Nations [Moscow writes) is due to the recent entry into the
UN of a number of countries of Asia and Africa, which together
with the Soviet Union and other socialist states come out
for a strengthening of international peace and security. 1
1 Voprosy vneshnei politiki SSSR, p. 68,
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An examination of voting patterns, Soviet analysts find, shows "that
the Unitid States is steadily losing support." While it may still
formally command a majority, it no longer controls a "machine" vote--
a trend which amounts to a "serious moral and political defeat"
for the Wstern "ruling circles*" 2
2, See, e.g., V. Alexandrov, 'Th 13th UN General Assembly," International
Affairs, 1958, no. 12, p. 16, Another recent Soviot statement elaborates:
"The time is not far off when the whole system of colonialism in all its
forms and manifestations will be over, and when every formerly enslaved
people, having formed its sovereign state, will be an equal and full.
fledged member of the United Nations0 eooThis will .strengthen the
position of those states which conduct an anti-imperialist struggle. . .[and7 will contribute to the isolation in the United Nations of . o
the architects of, o v the cold war. '" (Zadoroshnyi, 00N i mirnoe
sosushehestvovanie gosudarstv, p, 10,)
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This greater confidence in the UN membership--and the United
Nations as a whole--has been reflected in a recent Soviet effort
to secure more administrative positions for itself and in the greater
willingness and even initiative to submit issues to the General
Assembly, which previously the Soviet Union avoided because of the
absence of the veto power there. Adlai Stevenson relates his con-
versation with Khrushchev in August 1958, at the time of the Middle
atern riss, when theLove Premier rejected the Security Council
-s the forum for a high-1evol conference. "le proposed a special
meeting of the General Assembly 'with all countries participating,
to condemn the aggressors and demand the withdrawal of their troops
from Lebanon and Jordan,, I suppose he was fearful that any such
condemnation would be voted down overwhelmingly in the Security
Council, It was apparent that the General Assembly looked to him
like a better forum for a Soviet effort to mobilize opinion against
'3Britain and America. Such an attitude has indeed been reflected
in Soviet maneuvers at the United Nations. Soviet officials have
rather openly envisaged a future situation in which the Soviet Union
and Communist China would be joined by another peruanent member
and a majority of non-permanent members on the Security Council,
and then (to quote a remark attributed to a Soviet delegate)...
thle United Sttes will be glad to have the veto power.
3, Adlai Stevenson, Friends and Enemies (New York: arpers, 1959),
pp. d-5.
Such a forecast is not quite so far-fetched as it might appear
ot first sight. Without abandoning its long-range exclusive aspirations,
the Soviet Union has striven to arrive at a modus vivendi that permits
the investment of time and effort-both of which are deemed to be
inevitably allies of the Communist cause--to secure Soviet advances
without recourse to force, "Peaceful coexistence" is an old Communist
formula, but It has never been used with such vigor-and in our thermo,
nuclear age, with such vital intensity--as at present,
Lenin insisted that international organizations in an overwhelming-
ly non-Communist world were fictions because war was inevitable under
capitalist conditions, Since 1956 Moscow no longer deems wars "fatally"
inevitable,, Does this shift have implications for the Soviet view
of international organizations? If so, Moscow has not spelled them
out. The change of outlook- prCbably means that international organiza-
tions--along with other institutions of the transitional era of
c oe.is tenco--can be serviceable tools for advancing Soviet predominance
without war. Indeed, Soviet criticism of the West for the past three
years has stressed Western failure to recognize the passing of its
"position of strength" and its refusal to concede the reality of the
pro-Soviet trend in the world, What the West must do, Moscow has
reiterated time and again, is to adopt a "position of reason" (i. e.,
a willingness to yield) in place of its previous "position of strength."
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World tensions remain because of the "unwillingness of Western foreign
policy to reckon with facts and its open opposition to reasonable
compromise on the outstanding issues 0 4 What the United Nations needs,
then, to contribute to world peace and security is some "good will."5
As is readily apparent, on all three levels conflicts are likely
to arise in the future: in Soviet relations within the "socialist
camp", in Soviet dealings with the non-Communist partners of the self-
styled "zone of peace", and in Soviet efforts to persuade the other
powers of the reality of "peaceful coexistence." In the last analysis,
other Communist-led states have proved to be far more refratory
than Moscow (or Bolshevik theory) 'had anticipated, and the two latter
strategies have from the outset, and xplicitly been intended only
for a "given historical epoch"--the transitional era in which "capitalist"
and "socialist" states oxist side by side. Moscow has been frank
in stating that the pri.nciple of "proletarian internationalism" among
Communist nations is intended "for a longer period of time" than
the principles of "peaceful coexistence" and adherence to conventional,
1- 6
"bPourgeois" international law.
-. [Editorial,] "The United Nations and the Current World Situation,"
International Affairs, 1956, no. 11, p. 16.
5, Mezhdunarodnyi politiko-ekonomicheskii ezhegodnik 1958, p. 537.
6 M. Airapetian, Leninskie printsipy vneshnei politiki sovetskogo
gosudarstva (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957), p. 65. In his interview
with Timoo Hirooka, editor of the Tokyo Asahl Shimbun, on June 18,
1957, Khrushchev likewise affirmed the superiority of "proletarian
internationalisn" over "peaceful coexistenceot" A recent Soviet study
confirms that coexistence is "based on the deep conviction that o
from this competition the socialist system will inevitably emerge
victorious," (Levin, 2g cit0 , p. 9.)
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Even if Moscow looks forward to a United Nations as a Soviet
front" organization, it clearly does not and cannot afford to bank
nsuch fen cventuality.i For the next few years the Soviet bloc
cannot control a UN majority. Hence its strategy is likely
to continue imaginative but on the whole cautious enough not to gamble
all to win cr lose all, Indeed, at present the Soviet leaders--in
spite' of their elction over recent propaganda victories in it,
still. see the United Nations largely as an American captive Khrushchev
has been renarkably outspoken in his comments, which indicate un-
mistakenly that the United Nations is not by any means central in
his thinking on world affairs. In an interview with Turner Catledge
of The New York Times, on May 10, 1957, Thrushchev dicussed European
Perhaps it would be expedient to set up some kind of special
body whear the participants in a European security system could
exchange views to prevent tension in the relations between
countries. If enough confidence was established, then in that
case perhaps the need for a special body would fall away and pro-
blems could be examined in the United Nations....
When thereupon Mr. Catledge asked, "Do Wou regard the United Nations
as an important international instrument for the settlement of
international problems? the answer he received was
The United Nations can of course be regarded as a useful instrument.
But I would be going against my conscience if I called it an
important instrument for the settlement of international problems
today. So long as a situation exists in the UNO where every-
thing is bossed by the UMited States, where the Uenited States
commands countries receiving sops froait, that organization
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7ill in effect be not an international organization but a branch
o the USA. Of course, even today it happens that the UN
oxpresses the aspirations and desires of the peoples. But,
ogretfully, such cases are rare.
A :few months later Khrushchev again explained, in an interview with
correspondent Henry- Shapiro:
Some of the UN delegations ofter. vote with the United States,
but after the voting they come up to our delegation and apologize
for not having voted forthe Soviet proposals even though they
believe them to be correct (what cat we do, we depend on American
credits). How can the many member nations of the United
Nations which are in debt to the Unite'd States act independently?
The United Nations of course does something useful and that
is why we belong to it. But it is a meahanism that stalls
in its work. This must be talzen into ac, ount.i
And when Anastas Mikoyan visited the United S-lates, he replied with
reference to the UN resolution on Hungary: "It was adopted through
the voting machine, the majority (of]which is at the disposal of the
United States." 9 Izvestia confirms: "The drill sergeant system that
American representatives have imposed on the United Nationa for fourteen
years is the main reason that the organization has not lived up to the
hopes resting upon iton9a
There is undoubtedly an element of convenient apolov in this
assertion that anti-Soviet votes are not really anti-Sovie: but
7, R. S. Khrushchev, Speeches and Interviews on World Problems 1957
8. Ibid., p. 274 (interview of November 14, 1957),
9. The New York Tiues, January 19, 1959. The Russian original o
the statemrent (before being diplomatically wean the Soviet
interpreter) was, "whic: obeys the United States."
9a. Izvestia, June 26, 1959o
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merely reflections of economic indebtedness to the United States
(a situation apt to end, as Moscow sees it, as Soviet economic might
and economic contacts abroad grow apace in the years ahead)0 Yet
one need not doubt the major point made by Khrushchev: Soviet member-
ship in the United Nations and the organisation itself are still
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considered "useful" but not "important.1
In Moscow's view, the present transitional phase is marked
by the fact that, although the political inferiority of the Soviet
Union is already a matter of the past, the "socialist bloc" does
not yet have the edge. Thanks to Afro-Asian support, the camp
led by the Soviet Union is gaining in strength in its contest with
the Western camp, which (Moscow tells us) relies on
iltar alin , -araen e and the suppression of national
liberation movements to "imovse an Aerican diktat upon other
countries."11 The formula for Soviet policy at the United Nations
in this intermediate period is to seek (1) sanction for the status
quo; (2) a peculiar sort of truce, in which the several states may
individually gird for combat and wage economic and ideological
otrife but the United Nations would be directed, for instance, to
avoid "controversial" issues in making information available to
member states; and (3) "parity" in rcpresentat.ion.
10. This has been the attitude for over a decade. In 1947 the Soviet
tertbook of international law declared: "The importance of international
organizations ust not be overest.imated. Such organizations aterially
facilitate relations among states and to a certain extent promote
technical and scientific development. .. They certainly do not put
an end to the inherent contradictions of the capitalist world."
(Durdenevsky and Krylov, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo, 1947, p. 409.)
11. V, A. Zorin, statement at press conference on conclusion of
13th session of the General Assembly, December 12, 1958.
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The latter drive has apparently not been the subject of extensive "theo-
retical formulations. Indeed, its spirit is difficult to reconcile with Soviet
propaganda in favor of equality of member states,-for, in essence, it demands
that representation in important bodies--concerned, for instance, with nuclear
weapons oi- outer space-correspond to power realities rather than to ratios of
membership in the 'nited Nations. Reflecting the Soviet sense of power, so -typ.-
ical of the sputnik age, the Soviet delegation has refused to participate in the
work of the UN Disarmament Commission, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Spnce, and the Committee on Space Research, unless the total number of Soviet and
neutralist members on these bodies at least equaled that of the Western nations
there represented. 1
This stand has dramatized the sense of might and independence of the Soviet
Union--and has led India and the United Arab Republic to join in abstaining from
meetings of the outer space committee. In fact, to be effective, operational
recommendations of such committees must have the wholehearted and unanimous sup.
port of members, whatever the arithmetic of representation. In terms of polit-
ical prestige, however, the drive for parity implies a significant Soviet demand
to have the United States acknowledge its status as co-equal on the world scene
While it feels that it cannot yet ask for more, Moscow feels that it need settle
for no less-nmeanwhile safeguarding its freedom of action and iumunity from for-
eign inspection.*
1. See, for instance, The New York Ties, April 28, May 5, a10 959.
The sense of being ou nubered was reflected in Khrushhev's conversation with
a group of nine American governors (which the author attended) in July 1959.
Seeking to monopolise the conversation, Khrushchev kept the governors from inter-
rupting, with the remrk, "Don't gang up on meI let m talkA What do you think
this is, the United Nations?"
98a
It is possible that there is some disagreement in the Soviet leadership over
the precise place of the United Nations--as there has been, in recent years, over
a wide range of foreign policy issues, from Yugoslavia to cultural exchanges,
The neo-Stalinists, until 1957 represented by Molotov, have in effect advocated
a boycott or "conspiracy of silence" of inconvenient activities and decisions
of the United Nations. The Khrushchevites, on the other hand, flexible and opti-
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mistic, have been prepared to work with the United flations to a grea-ter extent
but without any intention of weakening ways and means of warding off UN "attacks"
on national sovereignty and the veto power. These defenses have served the Sov-
iet Union well--as in the Hungarian crisis of 1956.
Within the Soviet leadership, it is safe to assume that the military tends
to ignore the United Nations and that the Communist Party aooaratchiks likewise
view it with a mixture of cynicism and disdain. The dominant view, then, is ant
to be distinctly manipulative and eclectic: The United Nbations is an organization
to be "used" if and when convenient0 Both major groupc--the more isolationist
and the more expansive wings- -rvtejct,, as all Communists must, the "one-world"
aspects and implications of United N"ltions activities. In this regard. t.here is
no change apparent. The Soviet Union views the United Nations as a vehicle of
policy0 not as a bridge or meeting-ground to compromise negotiable differences
of ideology, social philosophy, or theories of interpersonal and international
relations,
The determinants of Soviet policy toward the Unite9 Nations are to be found
outside the United Nations. Moscow has learned to ignore the United Nations
with impunity, Soviet leaders have traditionally preferred bilateral negotiations
to mass assemblies not stage-managed by themselves. The Soviet press has clairted,
for instance, that the Iran crisis of 1946 was resolved not by the United Nations
but by direct negotiation. On the whole the United Nations has acted either
"under pressure from the USA" (as in Korea) or else as "nothing more than a
passive registrar of world events." The United Nations had nothing to do with
easing international tensions: the Geneva spirit was a product of the great
powers' own endeavors.12 Recent Soviet insistence on summit talks and pn apoarent
12, (Editorial,) "On the Eve of the llth Session of the U.N. General Assembly,"
International Affairs, 1956, no . 10, p. 12.
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rebuff of efforts of Secretary-General lammerskjfld to assist in the solution
of the German crisis point in the same direction. The initial Soviet strategy
and all the zigzags thereafter can be traced to changes outside the United Nations0
The Soviet Union has insisted, in recent years, on Western recognition of the
strts. Qgo. What this amounts to in the UN context is the realization that the
Soviet Union can ignore the outside world-and the United Nations--when it comes
to issues within the "socialist camp", at the spme time that it can seek to exploit
the United Nations on problems concerning other nations. Moscow has insisted
that conditions and relations within the Soviet orbit are outside the purview of
the United Nations or anyone else. As Khrushchev suggested in recent interviews
with Walter Lippmann, Adlai Stevenson, and others, the real stat. o today is
revolution itself. Thus the convenient formula of the gjatus .ggo means with res-
pect to Eastern Europe (and China) acquiescence in the present system; while the
S _stuts quo_ in the outside world means recognition of the unalterable "revolution-
ary" process, i~e, the world drift toward Communist victory. "Peaceful coexis.
tence" is not international conciliation but a means of combat 0 .
.WIhat does >oscow expect to gain from the pursuit of its efforts through the
United Nations?
Membership, even at times of considerable adversity, has conferred on the
Soviet Union valuable opportunities for the settlement of some relatively minor
disputes,, for information- gathering and international contacts, for gaining pres-
tige and resopectability as a major power in the family of nations; and, of utmost
i-moortance, for propaganda, Soviet analy3ts have candidly discussed in what ways
there is "need and viability for this international organization founded on the
principles of oe-aceful coexistence", They have note'l that the United Nations
has value as an "international forcm"; as a gathering point of increasing uni-
versality, including especially "young states of the Asian and African conti-
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nents"; and as a vehicle for the dissemination of Soviet declarative proposals
(such as the suggestions, at the 12th session of the General Assembly, to ;dopt
declrations on peacefu1 coexistence, on stopping nuclear weapons tests, and on
oblig'ations not to employ nuclear weapors). These presumably outweigh such "shame-
ful pages" a Korea and Hungary in the record of the United Nations. What is needed
above all is for the United States to stop "flagrantly violating the United Nations
Charter", (nd its "undeviating observance by all the members of the Organization."13
Such an outlook foretolls the type of issues which Moscow is likely to submit
to the United Nations in the next Elew years-- selecting then in arbitrary and oppor-
tunist fashion whenever there is promise of success: issues of Western racial and
trade discrimination in dealings with other peoples; charges of colonialism, as
over -'est I.rian and Goa; attacks on "imperialismn," of the Suez or Lebanese crises
type; demands for the evacation of foreign troops and foreign bases; insistence
on uniiversal membership, including the admission of Comrunist Chinn and the MIongol-
!,an People's Republic; and various proposal on disarmaerrint, weapons testing, and
declrative ~prohibitions on certain Oategories of arms and forces. As in the past,
the Soviet Union will oppose the use of the United NIations for issues where it
can negotiate more effectively on a bilateral basis from a "position of strength"
or whare majority opinion (and, to some extent 0 public opinion outside the United
Nations) is hostile to the Soviet stando
What this suggests is a shift in the ideal imaie of the United Nations in
the Soviet mind from I security org,,anization to a "front" organization. The
initi3l Soviet comritment to participate in the League and in the United Nations
can safely be taken sr due primarily to xn enrdeavor to buttres-s Russian security,
ThIs, it would appear, has been a receding consideration With Great Power dis-
13, 0., N:akropin, "h nited Nations Must Be an Instrument of Peacesi, I nteratio.9
A Ca-rs' 195/, no 11. pp. 114-1?.
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putes and qualitatively crucial developments in ,epons technology, with the
relative growth of Soviet military and economic power, and with a deeply-ingrained
reluctance to trust in the mechanics of a "non-power" debating club, the Soviet
'Jnicn has not and will not rely on the United Nations for its securitye Cn the
other hand, the United Nations emerges in the set of Khrushchevite strategies as
a super-Bandung or super-Cairo, an extension of world peace congresses and other
institutions which, behind the scenes,, Communists strive to control and manipulate.
The world is far from seeing the United Nations converted into a boviet "front,"
Indeed, once that effort succeeded, the need for it would disappear , for the United
Nations in its present complexion and outlook can have no place in the future commonwealth
of communist nations. In the interim, it can be a serviceable tool. ow realistic
is this Soviet outlook? On the whole, it has been realistic about the balance
of power, about the capabilities and vulnerabilities of states. It has tended,
and :ot without reason, to ignori the Unitedi Dations as a crucial or powerful
obstacle on its path. Indeed what could the United Nntions do in the face of Sov-
iet hostility? "The United Nrtions in this situmtion inot powerless, but neither
is it indispensable," Raymond Ardn has saido "ooIf the United Nations did not -- et
it is to be doubted whether the Soviet Union would invade Iran or Yugoslavia."
Armaments nay or, may not forestall wars; surely international organizations do not. 4
This. one mioay take it, corresoonaa to the Soviet viE;point, and to this extent
it is suoramely realistic.
Yet a substantial unrealism intervenes when Soviet analysis concerns a pluralist
world. The Soviet world view invites dialectic, dichotomic perceptions bipolarity is
the natural shape to which Moscow imagines the universe to tend. Indeed, the Soviet
image of the United Nations has been-from the formula contained in the major
encyclopedia to the summary in ,he
144 Phiip E. Jacob, ed,, Th 1. tre of the Initde Nztions (Annals, vol. 2960
November 1954), po 23,26,
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basic text on foreign affairs--one of struggle between "two opposite political
linet"--with the Soviet bloc faithfully defending the organization against the
American-led "g-ravediggers of sovereignty," proponents of colonialism, advocates
of nitariam and racism, tools of monopoly capitalism. So long as such bipolarity
prevails, Soviet' analysis is simole (so:metires too simnle to fit the facts) and
often shrew:d.
It is precisely with regard to neutralism--the crucial "third" element in
this bipolar coilex--that this analysis is apt to run into difficulty. 4oscow
assumes--probably correctly that sooner or later the neutrals must fall into line.
In the long run they cannot sit on the fence. "Either here or there," has been
Khrushchev's comment about Tito and others who have sought to avoid identification
with either camp. The muting of specifically Communist objectives is admittedly
a strategem to attract fellow-travelers who may wish to go part of hut not all
the way on the same road as the Soviet Union. As a Con aunist official of the Indian
state of Kerala told Averell Harriman in early 1959, the fact that you expect to
be a log in your next incarnation does not need to make you bark now0 15 Which
wa7 the uncommitted will go when forced by the logic of international strife and
Soviet (and American) prodding to "align" themselves remains in doubt. There is
here an area of fluidity which can be turned to M'osco.c's disadv-ntage. Soviet
insistance on ultimate bipolarity itself is 'apt to contribute to antagonizing
this "third force."
Otherwise Soviet conduct.-rigid in many respects.-has been increasingly
flexible. Soviet behavior at the United Nations has been less and less Zauche0
Soviet performance and personnel have been more and more competento There has
been time to train Soviet U specialists, who have an integral part in Soviet
foreign office and foreign policy structure and strategy0
As for the basic Soviet relationshio with the United States and the other
15- T New _York Times. March 16, 1959,
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non-Comiunist great powers,, Moscow does not expect any basic changes to result
from and through the TJnited Nations. Those difficulties have their roots outside
the orgianization and go well beyond it. In this one respect "their" and "our"
vietw is likely to coincide. In the words of George F. Kennan0
it is not fair to the Organization today to ask it to resolve
the rwedicaments of the ppst as well as of the present 0 N1o
international organization can be stronger than the structure
of relationships among the Great ?owers that underlies it; and
to look to such an organization to resolve deep-seated
conflicts of interest among the Great Powe-s is to ignore its 1 6
limitations and to jeopardize its usefulness in other fields0
16,: George F. Kennan, Russia,, the Atom and the West (New York: Iarpere, 1958), Po 27
